Strengthening Local Capacity in Responding to the Challenges of Globalization:
Training on Globalization and Democratic Governance for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and Academic Institutions at the Local Level

GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE
Review of Literature

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Globalization

Globalization is a heavily contested concept in terms of its meaning, form, and implication. Despite a burgeoning literature, no cogent theory of globalization or a systematic analysis of its primary features has been formulated. What confuses the issue is that while the term “globalization” is widely used, there is no common language as to what it is. It connotes different things to different people simply because it is not amenable to a precise definition (Singh 2004). Often suggested as a buzzword, it has become “a label to cover whatever strikes our fancy” (Scholte 2000, 15), “a fashionable concept in social sciences, a core dictum in the prescriptions of management gurus and a catchphrase for journalists and politicians of every stripe” (Hirst and Thompson 1996, 1). Globalization has grown to be so commonplace; it is invoked either as the proverbial culprit or panacea. As Held et al. (1999, 1) have suggested, “globalization is in danger of becoming, if it has not already become, the cliché of our times: the big idea which encompasses everything from global financial markets to the Internet but which delivers little substantive insight into the contemporary human condition.” Indeed, globalization has turned into a slippery and ambiguous term that is subject to misunderstanding and political manipulation (Helleiner 2001). Littered with traps and cul-de-sac, globalization has been used repeatedly as a straw man by individuals relying on obfuscation or normative definition to argue their case against it.

This review of literature surveys the current discourse on globalization, with particular focus on the three principal issues that constitute the major sources of contention:

- Conceptualization (“What”)
- Periodization (“When”)
- Causation (“Why” or “How”)

No attempt is made to resolve contentious views and issues.

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THE “WHAT” QUESTION: 
Defining Globalization

In order to dispel any misconceptions about globalization, Helleiner (2001) emphasizes the need to clarify two totally different phenomena that are often linked to the term. The first is an observable fact or reality, in which it is futile to argue of being “for” or “against” because it is simply an occurrence: the “shrinkage of space and time that the world has experienced in the consequence of the technological revolutions in transport, communications and information processing” (28). The second usage of the term relates to “matters of human policy choice”: the degree to which one opens and submits oneself mindlessly to this event or external forces. There is a tendency to conflate or intertwine these two phenomena such that globalization has become a slogan of technology-driven, uncontrollable incidents (fact) and policies formulated to take advantage of these external forces (choice).

The broad strokes of globalization as presented by Nobel Laureate in Economics Joseph Stiglitz, linchpin of the anti-globalization movement in the South Kavaljit Singh, and scholar of political economy David Held adhere to this factual interpretation of the term. In his seminal book *Globalization and Its Discontents*, Stiglitz (2002, 9) characterizes globalization as “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders.” Similarly, Singh (2004, 9) equates globalization to “a world in which complex economic, political, social and cultural processes operate and interact without any influence of national boundaries and distance” in the same way as Held et al. (1999, 1-2) refers to it as “a historical process which transforms the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or inter-regional networks of interaction and the exercise of power.”

Such reference to increased interconnectedness or interaction across borders has prompted Scholte (2000, 15-16) to encapsulate and associate globalization to five concepts that are equally contentious:

1. **Internationalization**, wherein “global” is simply another adjective to describe cross-border relations between countries and “globalization” designates a growth of international exchange;
2. **Liberalization**, which entails the removal of government-imposed restrictions on movement between countries in order to create an “open”, “borderless” world economy;
3. **Universalization**, in which “global” means “worldwide” and “globalization” is the process of spreading various objects and experiences to people at all corners of the earth;
4. **Westernization** or **modernization**, especially in an “Americanized” form, whereby globalization is no longer neutral but a dynamic as a result of social structures of modernity (capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, bureaucratism, etc.) that are spread the world over, normally destroying preexistent cultures and local self-determination in the process; and
5. *Deterritorialization*, or the spread of supraterritoriality, wherein globalization entails a reconfiguration of geography so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, distances, and borders.

Although Scholte cautions the use of such redundant terms and opts for “supraterritoriality” to describe globalization, these characterizations are found in both prevailing and emergent discourse on globalization from the North and South (see Panitch 1998, Rodrik 1998, Keohane and Nye 2001, Held and McGrew 2002, Harrison 2005).

*A Disciplinary Focus*

Beyond the general approach is a tendency to understand globalization in its various and distinctive respects, depending largely on the disciplinary perspectives that are employed.

In the economic field, for example, the radical transformation and integration of the economic environment at the local, regional and global levels through the promotion of an open international economy, is often highlighted. Economists often refer to Adam Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations* when explaining the “inspiration” behind the new economic order. In this classic statement of liberal political economy, Smith posited harmony between private profit and public interest and claimed that the pursuit of individual interests benefits society as a whole through the invisible hand of the market. Sachs (2000, 94-96) identifies four important features or “realities” of economic globalization: (1) increased international trade, as demonstrated by the rising ratio of either exports or imports to gross domestic product (GDP) for any economy in the world; (2) increased penetration of markets by capital flows; (3) internationalization of economic production, often through cross-border production and trade between multinational companies and their affiliates (“intra-firm”) or fragmentation and spreading of production across borders, so that the parts, components and accessories contained in a product are manufactured in several countries (“intra-product”); and (4) institutional harmonization of economic policies, legislation, and structure. The world-systems approach, based on the work of Immanuel Wallerstein, has often been used to explain economic globalization. This approach is based on the distinction between core, semiperipheral, and peripheral countries in terms of their changing roles in the international division of labor dominated by the capitalist world-system (Sklair 1999). Though the capitalist world-system has been basically international for centuries, the extent and degree of trade and investment globalization has increased greatly in decades. An important question, therefore, is whether or not the most recent wave has actually integrated the world to a qualitatively greater extent that it was integrated during the former wave (Chase-Dunn 1999).

Among Philippine economists and civil society organizations, the most prominent facet of globalization is its economic dimension, often related to the predominance of neoliberalism (de Dios 1998, Lim 1998, Frago, Quinsaat, Viajar 2004).

By contrast, the literature on the politics of globalization focuses largely on the fortunes of the nation-state as its unit of analysis, examining the changing relations of state and capital, the emergence of new international actors and institutions, and the implications of new forms of regional and global governance. From a liberal internationalist perspective, Ohmae (1995) contends that the nation-state has been fatally undermined as the key locus of policy authority by the global system, unable significantly to influence economic activity. Furthermore, the concept of “national interest” has been more or less used as defense of special interests, not of people’s interest, and therefore the demise of the state is nothing to be mourned. But such
positions have not gone unchallenged. Hoogvelt’s (1997) analysis of the political economy of globalization offers a useful summary of more skeptical analyses of the politics of globalization and its significance for the state. She notes three models which can be used to frame the globalization question. One is the realist model, focusing on the autonomy of the nation-state in the conduct of international relations, with order, stability, and international balance of power as its main concern. The second is the institutionalist perspective, based on liberal values of economic interdependence and cooperation and strong support for a system of global governance. And finally, the structuralist approach which suggests a dominant core and subordinate periphery in the structures of global economic and political relations. In all three cases, there is no a priori supposition that the state has or is likely to disappear. Nonetheless, globalization calls into question the ability of the existing interstate system to cope with certain fundamental transnational problems (Mittelman 2002).

In the field of cultural studies, there is a tendency to associate globalization with the destruction of distinctive cultural identities and the creation of a homogenous “global culture.” In the same manner as weak nations become casualties of unbridled economic globalization, a common argument is that their cultures are vulnerable to the encroachment of Westernized ideas, values, and lifestyles (Tomlinson 1991). The driving forces behind this homogenization—or to be more specific, “Westernization” or “cultural imperialism”—is the mass media. Marshall McLuhan’s “global village” comes to life as everyone is exposed to the same images, almost instantaneously. However, promoting mainly Western culture which market philosophies of consumption or individualism, the developed mass media has become the weapon of neo-colonialist powers to further advance global capitalism. By contrast, other scholars have doubted the “homogenization” or “cultural imperialism” theses to explain the cultural dimensions of globalization. They argue that global communications and markets are often adapted to fit diverse local contexts, such that cultural diversity is strengthened rather than undermined (Appadurai 1996). Robertson (1995), for example, suggests that global media and products breed heterogenization and calls this process of adaptation “glocalization,” where the perceived means of creating a uniform culture take different forms and make different impact depending on local particularities. Between these opposite readings, some scholars speak not of a cultural uniformity or increased cultural diversity, but the emergence of “hybrid” cultural identities (Pieterse 1995). Intercultural relations are further intensified with globalization, such that new patterns of meanings and identities—through combinations or obscurities, are generated.

The Multidisciplinary Approach

Given that globalization is best thought of as a multifaceted process, a constructive approach to framing the globalization discourse involves theoretical perspectives that attempt to aggregate its various dimensions. One useful “mapping” exercise has been put forward by Held et al. (1999), who recompose the various issues comprising the debate into three schools of thought—hyperglobalists, skeptics, and transformationalists.

The hyperglobalist thesis argues that “economic globalization is bringing about a ‘denationalization’ of economies through the establishment of transnational networks of production, trade and finance” (Held et al. 1999, 3). It basically abides by an economic logic—neoliberalism—which venerates the principle of global competition and the emergence of a single global market as the precursors of human development. Within this framework, there is considerable normative divergence between the neoliberals such as
Friedman (1999), who welcome the triumph of individual autonomy and the preponderance of the market over the state, and the radicals—classical Marxists or neo-Gramscians—like Panitch (1998) and Bello (2002) for whom contemporary globalization represents the triumph of an oppressive global capitalism. Despite the differences in positions, both breed of hyperglobalizers share a “set of beliefs that globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon; that an increasingly integrated global economy exists today; that the needs of global capital impose a neoliberal economic discipline on all governments such that politics is no longer the ‘art of the possible’ but rather the practice of ‘sound economic management’” (Held et al. 1999, 4).

By comparison, skeptics represented by Hirst and Thompson (1996) question the factual evidence of globalization. At best, what have taken place are heightened levels of internationalization—or interactions between predominantly national economies. They further counter the blanket assumption of the beneficial aftershocks of globalization and the end of the nation-state in a more open world order. While globalization enhances more pluralistic, diversified and multipolar international economic and political relations, the authors posit that the state remains a key source of rules and decision-making in regulating the resulting uncertainties of globalization. They see the nation-state as persisting despite the changing concept of territoriality resulting from the increasing interdependence of nations. Hirst and Thompson contend that the rule of law becomes more important rather than less if we are moving into a more complex and pluralistic social and political system, such that the state which is the purveyor of “constitutional ordering” will become more central and not less. Likewise, even if the world economy and polity become increasingly internationalized in the current era, international regimes and agencies will still be governed by binding rules and laws emanating from the member-states. Thus, in simple terms, skeptics believe that the internationalization has not weakened the state, but somehow, strengthened it in the process.

Between the hyperglobalists and skeptics is the transformationalist thesis which argues that the contemporary processes of globalization are “historically unprecedented such that governments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs” (Held et al. 1999). While contemporary globalization processes involve the spatial re-organization of economic, political, military, and cultural power, the interconnectedness that is taking place transforms rather than reduces state capacity and control. The power, functions, and authority of national governments are juxtaposed with the expanding jurisdiction of institutions of international governance and legal systems. In the process, globalization becomes highly and inherently uneven in its embrace and impact as it divides at the same manner that it integrates; thus the presence of winners and losers (Khor 2001, Nayyar and Court 2002, Singh 2004).

THE “WHEN” QUESTION: Locating the Period of Globalization

Another principal issue in debates about globalization concerns temporal relation. In economic sense, for instance, de Dios (1998) claims that globalization is far from being a new trend as world trade has been growing faster that world production over the last three decades, suggesting that the world has become increasingly integrated since that time. Even UNDP (1999) acknowledges that the idea of “shrinking space, shrinking time and disappearing borders” is antiquated.
Is this so-called “globalization” new to contemporary history? Did it start several years ago? The expression “era of globalization” is now used in everyday language, but is it possible to establish a globalization “timeline”? Does it have a point of origin? Is it linear or cyclical?

Essays of historians in answer to these questions are collected by A.G. Hopkins in *Globalization in World History*. It examines globalization in its full historical context. The authors argue that globalization took four different forms over the past three centuries (Hopkins 2002, 1-9):

1. **Archaic globalization**, which was present before industrialization and the nation-state and did not extend to Americas and Australasia but “exhibited some strikingly ‘modern’ features” such as the importance of cities, migrants and diasporas, and specialization of labor;
2. **Proto-globalization**, which refers to “two interacting political and economic developments that became especially prominent between about 1600 and 1800 in Europe, Asia and parts of Africa: the reconfiguration of state systems, and the growth of finance, services and pre-industrial manufacturing”;
3. **Modern globalization**, which is defined by the appearance of two key elements after about 1800: the rise of the nation state and the spread of industrialization; and
4. **Post-colonial globalization**, which refers to the contemporary form that can be dated from the 1950s and characterized by the rise of new types of supraterritorial organization and regional integration.

On the other hand, Scholte (2000, 62-88) argues that if globalization is defined in terms of the spread of supraterritoriality then we can distinguish three phases of globalization: (1) the emergence of a “global imagination” from the period up to the 18th century, when “global consciousness began to tease secular imagination” of the planet as a single place but the concept of globality was mainly a passing rather than a central thought; (2) incipient globalization from 1850s to 1950s when supraterritoriality and material global relations began to develop in communications technologies, markets, finance, and institutions; and (3) full scale globalization from 1960s to present when the pace and scale of the expansion of transworld relations have become qualitatively immense such that this acceleration has even brought some growth in transborder solidarities.

**THE “WHY” AND “HOW” QUESTIONS:**
Explaining the Causes of Globalization

The globalization conundrum is further complicated by the thin and loose treatment or deliberate evasion of most scholars on its possible causes. Did globalization as an “idea whose time has come” just unfolded fortuitously? What forces generated this trend or process?

Scholte (2000) argues that globalization transpired owing to (1) the spread of rationalism or the general configuration of knowledge that has greatly promoted the spread of global thinking; (2) certain turns in capitalist development, particularly the pursuit of global markets; (3) technological innovations in data processing and communications, which played crucial roles in creating transworld social spaces; and (4) the construction of enabling regulatory frameworks—technical and procedural standardization; liberalization of cross-border movements of money, investments, goods and services (but not labor); guarantees of
property rights for global capital; and legalization of global organizations and activities. These causes of globalization are co-dependent.

On the other hand, Panitch (1998, 12-13) offers three conjunctural facets of globalization: (1) the collapse of the USSR and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, as well as with the turn to capitalism of China and Vietnam, which led to the spatial extension of capitalism; (2) the ideological and cultural sweep of capitalist ideas that mark an era of neoliberalism; and (3) the transnational integration among the capitalist classes as evidenced by “the national locus of the owners and boards of directors of the leading multinational corporations.”

Likewise, focusing mainly on economic globalization, de Dios (1998) identifies four developments that have fuelled the engines of globalization: (1) the reshuffling of ownership brought about by foreign direct investment (FDI) which incidentally has grown four times faster than international trade; (2) the continuous reduction throughout the post-World War II period of barriers to trade and investment such as various taxes, standards, and regulations; (3) the industrialization of significant parts of the developing world, especially in Southeast Asia and Latin America; and finally, (4) the end of the Cold War, which removed the impediments to investments and facilitated production relocation.

Below is a summary of the basic features of globalization as systematized and condensed by Held et al. (1999, 10).

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<td><strong>Power of national governments</strong></td>
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Governance

Current studies on the governance discourse converge on the assertion that globalization carries with it the exigency of re-examining the concept of “governance” and framing new governance perspectives as alternatives to the old ones. As peoples and societies witness remarkable and accelerating changes both in their home fronts and beyond, the need to problematize traditional views on governance becomes increasingly relevant and of interest to scholars, state- and other non-state actors alike. Attempts to redefine “governance” are premised on the contention that there are now new and emerging forms of governance that our old notions of it are no longer adequate. Because globalization has ushered in changes in every aspect of life, governance, though a rather old concept, has certainly taken on a new meaning. As pointed out by Kooiman (1994), “the growing complexity, dynamics and diversity of our societies as caused by social, technological and scientific developments put governing systems under such new challenges that new conceptions of governance are needed” (6). In the same manner, although the governance debate presents different strands of arguments and analyses, numerous scholars agree that innovative approaches to governance are essential to capture recent developments in national, regional and global frontiers. For instance, Rosenau (1992) argue that “given the profound transformations in the nature and location of authority, legitimacy and compliance, and given the emergent roles and structures of the modern state, transnational organizations, social movements, common markets and political parties, the basis for extensive reexamination of government and governance in an increasingly interdependent world is surely compelling” (4). At the heart of these claims is therefore the need to come up with a new governance perspective that will cover new arrangements and new agents in the current type of governance as well as usher in new or alternative interpretations of it.

Corollary to the creation of a new governance perspective is the abandonment of the long-standing and archaic views about governance. Central to this is the traditional claim that the state has the monopoly of governance and as such, it is the only agent who can exercise a governing function. In contrast, a wide variety of sources on the governance discourse emphasize that “states are no longer the only actor who initiate and dominate the cascades which radiate out from the epicentre…[thus], a theory needs to be developed that treats globalized space as the locale of the epicentre, as a vast arena composed of actors and processes that are not limited by territorial boundaries of sovereign rights, as a bifurcated system composed of both state-centric and multi-centric worlds” (Rosenau 2000, 188). In fact, the emerging pattern of governance is said to position states as only one of the many actors who play a role in governance and “whose activities cascade erratically across amorphous ethnoscape, mediascape, ideoscape, technoscope, and financescape” (Rosenau 2000, 172) that affect governance as a whole.

These old notions of governing systems are continuously being challenged as new channels and processes of governance cascade into and out of national and international policy spaces. The saliency accorded to the role of states in operating governing structures is now being disputed by new strands of reasoning within the governance discourse vis-à-vis the framework of globalization. As a result, new approaches to “governance” have surfaced in literatures. Although numerous scholars define governance in diverse ways, at the core of these divergent approaches is the consistent claim that governance, as it should be interpreted and applied at present, should have the element of democracy. “Governance”, as it has
evolved, operates within the broad context of the democratic agenda that embraces processes and principles designed to democratize governance in various layers of political, economic, social and cultural policy spaces by a wide range of actors and institutions. Although sources on governance differ in their definition and operationalization of the concept, they emphasize the importance and utility of democratic structures in defining, shaping and executing authority in the new form of governance. Falk (1995) even remarks that “governance without the shaping guidance of democratization in all major arenas is both dangerous to human survival prospects and oppressive in relation to the quality of life” (133), thus attaching democracy as an essential value to the present type of governance. Similarly, other authors advocate for a rethinking not just of our traditional views on governance but also of our old notions of democracy “on the assumption that [democracy itself] has no primary locus and no single demos: the nation-state shares power with increasingly salient sub-national governments, with proliferating forms of network and partnership governance, with a variety of quasi public and private organizations, with NGOs, with international agencies and other forms of supra-national governance” (Hirst 2000, 24). In this sense, one can find that central to the governance debate is the advocacy to appraise the relationship between governance and democracy where normative issues like transparency, accountability and increased participation by multi-networked and varied actors must be addressed by and incorporated in the discourse. The practice and interpretation of governance should thus capture the role of all the stakeholders that operate within and beyond governing systems. Hence, following the previous argument that the move to new forms of governance means an equal move to a new perspective on it, attempts to reinterpret governance have been done in relation to democracy. Meaning, a governance perspective, as it has evolved, is no less than that which advocates for and promotes a “democratized governance” that operates within and generates in turn a wider democratic space for more actors beyond the state. For instance, Pierre argued that “a governance perspective necessitates an elaboration of the concept of authority in such a way that it is not confined to vertical hierarchical structures in which subordinates comply with the directives of superiors. Rather, allowance must be made for authority that is embedded in horizontal networks and non-governmental collectivities…if globalized space is as heterogeneous as it appears to be, innovative ways of theorizing about accountability are needed. The democratic deficit that marks the multi-centric world needs to be approached in terms of rule systems that are not constrained by the domestic-foreign autonomy” (Rosenau 2000, 188). On the basis of these arguments, considerable amount of studies on the governance discourse approach “governance” in six major ways that differ in their definitions of the concept but are rather converging on their discernment on and advocacy for a “democratized governance”. (See Figure 1, page 14).

**Spatial-Temporal**

The first and usual approach to “governance” emphasizes the dichotomy between ‘old’ and ‘new’ governance and the differences in the principles enshrined in each. Scholars who ascribe to this method highlight the disparities between old forms of governance and the type that we have now. The assumption is that the old governance discourse places the state as the central and only agent performing the role of governing such that “both what makes up the agenda of political decision and the scope of power of state control are often not matters of community choice: many issues are imposed from without the political process and many activities cannot be controlled by political choice” (Hirst 2000, 22). In contrast, advocates of ‘new governance’ argue that “a mixture of the rise of economic liberalism and the rhetoric of globalization have undermined such beliefs. Together, they have over-diminished our
expectations as to what political power can accomplish” (Hirst 2000, 23) and what states can and cannot do in relation to governing, for that matter. Thus, it is not only that new conceptions of governance highlight the shift, if not the transfer, of power away from the central government to other societal forces within and beyond national territories. As we witness the increasing roles of Non-Governmental Organizations and international agencies, the old practice of the state as the principal runner of governance is now being put to question. In the same manner, whereas ‘old governance’ relies on the state as sources of authoritative values, scholars that rally behind the new governance framework claim that “states are no longer the only sources of legitimacy, accountability and law” (Hirst 2000, 32). In fact, according to Rhodes (2000), “the [new] governance discourse explores how the informal authority of networks supplements and supplants the formal authority of government; it also explores the limits to the state and seeks to develop a more diverse view of state authority and its exercise” (55). This can be summarized into two contending models of governance –the ‘state-centric’ vs. the ‘society-centric’. In the words of Hirst (2000), “while old governance is consistent with state-centric models of explanation in which the structure of the state is what matters for explaining different levels of performance, new governance is consistent with the society-centric models of explanation, [the principal question being] how the social forces are structured so as to both channel the inputs of society into government and to assist or not in implementation. Depending on the subset of the new governance literature being discussed, society becomes either a major contributor or a major hindrance to providing direction and to implementing policies. In either case, an understanding of governance begins with society and not with government itself” (48). Hence, the emphasis of ‘new governance’ on providing a wider space for democratic participation by other societal actors confirms that democracy, or at least some of its principles, is widely recognized in the discourse and is there as a central value as opposed to the other model.

KEY ACTORS/PLAYERS

The governance debate is most vibrant in its discussion of the key actors and institutions performing governance functions. This characterizes the second approach, which looks at governance in terms of the actors involved in it. Competing views on this aspect are arrayed in a spectrum where the state is seen as the central actor in defining governance and governance frameworks on the one end, and where other players such as the civil society, market and international agencies as new agents of governance occupy the other end. What could be seen in between, according to literatures, are interactions between and among these actors, making explicit a tri- or multi-sectoral partnership, which was rather absent in the old form of governance. One end illustrates the growing role of civil society groups, particularly NGOs, in performing governance functions. By discussing the positions NGOs and similar actors have occupied in this new context where governance exists, Keohane and Donahue (2000) argue “that governance need not necessarily be conducted exclusively by governments (12)” as NGOs and networks of NGOs also create and shape governance either in collaboration with or independently of official channels of authority. In fact, they furthered, “recent research suggests that international NGOs and NGO alliances are helping to formulate and implement many international decisions and policies, [shaping] international events in at least the following ways: identifying problematic globalization consequences that might otherwise be ignored, articulating new values and norms to guide and constrain international practice, building transnational alliances that advocate for otherwise ignored alternatives, altering international institutions to respond to unmet needs, disseminating social
innovations that have international applications, negotiating resolutions to transnational conflicts and disagreements, mobilizing resources and acting directly on important public problems. In these activities, international NGOs and NGO alliances have [thus] been building the attitudes and institutions for a transnational civil society that makes a different kind of international governance possible” (Brown et al. 2000, 284). On the national front, civil society groups and people’s organizations have likewise been enthusiastic in pushing for a ‘democratized governance’, in which people from the marginalized sectors can also have the opportunity not only to participate but more importantly to shape political, economic and social decision-making processes, which previously are deemed to be spheres exclusive to the state. In practice, literatures also highlight how civil society campaigns have influenced policy direction and formulation. In the Philippines, for instance, Rebullida (2005) describes that “the government has ceased to be the sole decision-maker and wielder of social and political power but shares these with civil society [as] represented by NGOs, POs and even with the private sector” (15). In fact, she added, “the Philippines operationalize governance by the participation of civil society and business-industry sectors in the policy-making process, in various ways such as setting the policy agenda, advocacy of policies and legislation” (15). Similarly, with emphasis on movements operating on the global scale, Brown et. al. (2000) chronicle that “increasingly during the past decade, transnational civil society alliances have been central to campaigns to formulate and enforce global public policies in response to critical problems” (284).

Apart from NGOs, the market, together with transnational corporations, also prove to be crucial players in today’s form of governance. By placing high premium on the role of private companies in creating new forms of governance, Keohane and Nye (2000) contend that not only are TNCs, as examples, developing their own ways of governing but also that they may replace legislative and even judicial functions of states as they craft their own standards and codes of conduct in the absence of effective and fair rules enforced by official channels of governments (22-3). Alongside markets, TNCs and private companies, there rise another key player with a growing task of governance –international agencies and institutions. Although their roles in governance are still subject to question, their activeness in offering interventions to national governance caught the attention of scholars. In fact, Keohane and Nye (2000) suggest that “…the retreat of the state has led to the extensive discussion of the role of international agencies and inter-state agreements and common commercial governmental practices like arbitration as methods of governance” (27).

The evolution of these non-state actors in assuming governance functions, however, has not totally vanished states according to some literatures. For instance, Hirst (2000) warns that “although governance is an entirely different phenomenon today [that]…states no longer have even the appearance of monopolizing governance, it does not mean that governance can be left to happenstance. [Meaning], the ad hoc pluralization of political authority and of extra-political power cannon simply be accepted [because] governance requires a relatively settled institutional architecture if it is to be effective. Gaps in governance and lack of coordination between levels of governance will underscore the efficiency of the governing bodies that there are” (24). With the same line of reasoning, Rhodes (2000) maintains that “though state’s capacities for governance have weakened, it remains a pivotal institution…[in that it is still] the source of constitutional ordering, providing minimum standards in a world of interlocking networks of public powers” (57-58). Hence, the debate continues as to whether the state is to be dismissed as the fulcrum of power and governance or if it has been replaced by other non-state agents whose influence on governance are ever-increasing. Nevertheless, what remains certain, and as reiterated in these collections of literatures, is that
governance as it is practiced and observed today, is now engaged in and shaped by a wide range of actors with the state, civil society, market and international institutions as the major ones.

**MODES/LEVELS**

Modes of governance differ not only in terms of actors. In some literatures, governance is discussed by virtue of the levels in which it is applied. Steering modes, according to Treib et al. (2004), can be hierarchical where rule emanates from the top to the bottom, with states and supra-national institutions as the dominant sources of governance (11). On the other hand, the non-hierarchical mode of governance entails bargaining across different segments and actors in society. Rulemaking does not necessarily emanate from the state such that this latter type of governance places the role of private-public partnerships and networks at its core. In the same manner, multicentricity is central to horizontal modes of governance with cross-relations between and among actors across global, regional, national and local levels. Repeating Keohane and Nye (2000), “rulemaking and rule interpretation in global governance have become pluralized. Rules are no longer a matter simply for states or intergovernmental organizations. Private firms, NGOs, subunits of governments, and the transnational and Trans-governmental networks that result, all play a role...As a result, any emerging pattern of governance will have to be networked rather than hierarchical” (37).

**FUNCTIONAL**

On the other hand, some researches on governance approach it on the basis of its usage. This functional approach to governance traces the nuances in the use of the concept in two main ways –governance as a process or pattern of interaction and governance as a system. In the first one, governance is defined “as the emerging pattern or order of a system that is both the outcome of social processes and interactions as well as the medium through which actors can act and interpret this pattern” (Kooiman 1994, 3). Perceiving governance as a process through which actors who engage in it interact and at the same time a pattern of such interaction, Kooiman (1994) expounds that “governance can be seen as the pattern or structure that emerges in a social-political system as ‘common result or outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of all involved actors’ (258). Because of the plurality and differentiation of society, this usage of governance highlights that the diverse yet interrelated activities of societal actors and institutions result to what is now central to the discourse –governance. Governance is a process simply because it collates the efforts of various players in society and integrates it into a system of governing. On the other hand, another paradigm looks at governance in a more rigid sense as a system of rule. However, rule here is not understood to be an exclusive property of governments. Governance in its new conception “is a more encompassing phenomenon than government [such that] it embraces governmental institutions, and informal non-governmental institutions [alike] whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs and perform their wants” (Rosenau 1992, 4). In addition, this type of usage also underscores the need for a ‘democratized governance’ as a system of rule. In fact, in Rosenau’s (1992) language, “governance is a system of rule that works only if it is accepted by the majority or at least by the most powerful of those it affects [in opposition] to governments [that] can function even in the face of widespread opposition to their policies” (4).
NORMATIVE DESCRIPTIONS

The re-conceptualization of ‘governance’ carries with it the resolve to democratize the old form of governance. Across literatures, one can find that normative issues are now attached to the label, describing what ‘type’ of governance and governing structures are needed in this fast-changing world. Hence, other literatures approach the concept of governance by concentrating on the moral issues it has to address. These issues then categorize and distinguish the types of governance according to its emerging themes and the major ones are as follows: good governance, corporate governance, humane governance, social-political governance and interdependent/partnership/multilateral governance. Hirst (2000) defines ‘Good Governance’ as a “means of creating effective political framework conducive to private economic action –stable regimes, rule of law and efficient trade administration-adapted to the rules that governments can perform and a strong civil society independent of the state” (14). This type of governance stresses the need for democratic structures in providing legitimacy to governance itself. Good governance can, in fact, be observed as a watchword of several international institutions like the World Bank, which incorporates in their definitions of development and modernization the principles of democracy as important components of good governance. In Rhodes (2000) chapter on ‘Governance and Public Administration’, he quoted “Leftwich’s three strands to good governance: the systematic, which covers the distribution of both internal and external political and economic power; the political, referring to the state enjoying both legitimacy and authority derived from a democratic mandate; and the administrative or the efficient, open and accountable and audited public service. In short, the author argues that “good governance marries with the new public management to the advocacy of liberal democracy” (57).

Closely related to the good governance framework is ‘Humane Governance’. Although the principle of ‘humaneness’ is often attached to the concept of ‘geo- or global governance’, it nevertheless applies to other levels of governance –local, national and regional. According to Falk (1995), “humane governance emphasizes people-centered criteria of success as measured by declines in poverty, violence and pollution and by increasing adherents to human rights and constitutional practices especially in relation to vulnerable segments of society as well as by axiological shifts away from materialist or consumerist and patriarchal conceptions of human fulfillment” (14). By defining humane governance as such, Falk stresses the need for ‘transnational democracy’ and the extension of democratic practices across various layers of governance. Further, Falk argues that the emergence of this theme, ‘humane governance’, was derived from the experience of peoples and societies under what he termed as its opposite, ‘inhumane governance’. At the forefront of the transition, he said, from inhumane to humane governance are civil society groups across the globe, implying the secondary roles of nation-states in this project. The important components of the normative project to achieve humane governance are the following: taming war, abolishing war, making individuals accountable, collective security, rule of law, nonviolent revolutionary politics, human rights, stewardship of nature, positive citizenship and cosmopolitan democracy (Falk 1995, 241-255).

On the other hand, ‘Corporate Governance’ emerged as a strategy to reform public management styles and improve administrative practices in the public sector. According to Rhodes (2000), corporate governance originally “refers to the way in which business corporations are directed and controlled” (56). Eventually, however, this has been translated to be of use to the public sector, advocating for an improved and efficient public governance.
Central to the advocacy of corporate governance is to reform public management by applying the procedures as well as principles used and upheld by private companies in dealing both with their clientele and material transactions. Further, the same literature explains that “corporate governance recommends openness or the disclosure of information; integrity or straightforward dealing and completeness; and accountability or holding of individuals responsible for their actions by a clear allocation of responsibilities and clearly defined roles” (Rhodes 2000, 56).

‘Social-Political’ Governance is another emerging theme in the governance discourse. With this as his subject of discussion, Kooiman (1994) elaborates the interdependency between and among social and political forces in creating structures and spaces for governance. Stressing that “public and private actors do not act separately but in conjunction with each other [and in] co-arrangements (2), the author furthers that “governance is a variety of forms of interaction between government and society and between the political and the social” (249). In contrast to our traditional notion of governance, which is silent about relations between and among state and non-state actors, social-political governance acknowledges not only the changing role of states as the forerunners of governance but also the rise of other stakeholders in defining and shaping what governance should be. The key word is thus ‘interactive’, where social and political players alike “create social and political conditions for the development of new models of interactive governing in terms of co-management, co-steering and co-guidance” (Kooiman 1994, 6).

Speaking of interaction and interdependence, the last major theme of governance that has emerged out of the new approaches, conceptions and analyses of the governance discourse upholds these two principles as its main components. ‘Interdependent, Partnership or Multi-lateral Governance’ gives weight to the coordination among a wide variety of actors existing in any given space. More encompassing than social-political governance, interdependent governance, as illustrated by Pierre (2000), involves coherence among a broad range of actors “different purposes and objectives such as political actors, and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and transnational organizations” (3-4). Under this type of governance is the ‘socio-cybernetic’ form of governance conceptualized by Rhodes (2000) “that highlights the limits to governing by a central actor, claiming that there is no single sovereign authority” (57). New patterns of interaction such as self- and co-regulation, public-private partnerships, co-operative management, and joint entrepreneurial ventures are the main facets characterizing this emerging form of governance (Rhodes 2000, 57). Similarly, Brown et al. (2000) outlines the emerging trend of multi-sectoral decision-making, where the state, market and civil society collaborate with each other in defining and shaping political processes. This is in consonance with the view that “tri-sectoral partnerships are also becoming more explicit (Keohane and Nye 2000, 24)” in providing some form of governance on a wide array of issues. Hence, as explained by the aforementioned literatures, there is no doubt that the more that new set of actors appear in the realm of governance, the more that normative issues, including democracy, also surface in that shape the direction of future governance.

TRAJECTORIES

The governance debate includes not only questions of who are involved in it nor how it is supposed to be understood in today’s terms. Other studies approach governance in terms of the contours it is likely to traverse in the future. For instance, Keohane and Nye envisage a global governance best described in the form of ‘network minimalism’. Accordingly,
“network minimalism seeks to preserve national democratic processes and embedded liberal compromises while allowing the benefits of economic integration” (2000, 37). On the one hand, it is said that governance is ‘networked’ because it operates within different sets of connections and arrangements as opposed to rigid and vertical linear structures and on the other, it is also ‘minimal’ such that it does not replace national governance configurations nor unnecessarily encroach on state autonomy (Nye and Keohane 2000, 14). Hirst (2000), in contrast, envisions what he calls as ‘Negotiated Social Governance’, taking governance as “related to new set of practices of coordinating activities through networks, partnerships and deliberative forums, … [embracing] a diverse range of actors from labour unions, trade associations, firms and NGOs to local authority representatives, social entrepreneurs and community groups” (18-9). Whether or not future governance will assume either of these forms, it is nevertheless clear that any understanding of the broad trajectory of governance involves the principles of democracy and democratization.

The above-mentioned studies explicitly point out that the move to new forms of governance brought about by globalization presents serious implications for how governments operationalize and practice it in their own home fronts. For this reason, new conceptions on governance urge the need for democracy and at the same time pose challenges to its principles as the debate goes on. In the meantime, what remains a crucial task for all studies on governance is to discuss and articulate how all the stakeholders and the actors in the governance spectrum can explore the possibilities for enhancing further its new components and emerging mechanisms in order to accommodate the values needed for democratization.

**Figure 1**

![Figure 1](image-url)
References:

Globalization


**Governance**


17


Other Suggested Materials:


Strengthening Local Capacity in Responding to the Challenges of Globalization:
Training on *Globalization and Democratic Governance* for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and Academic Institutions at the Local Level

A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS (IM) USED FOR TRAININGS/SEMINARS ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE

*Sharon Quinsaat*  

**INTRODUCTION**

Since the adoption of the 1991 Local Government Code of the Philippines, trainings and seminars on local governance have become widespread. Partnerships between and among public and private institutions have been formed to facilitate these workshops, which, among others, attempt to capture the emerging discourses on the changing role of local governments. Whereas trainings on local governance had primarily served as information drives aimed at introducing the Local Government Code at the outset, they have evolved to address more concrete issues such as decentralization, devolution, citizens’ participation, and good governance. The foci of trainings, in fact, highlight the need to increase and expand the decision-making at the sub-national and community levels. Similarly, these seminars have been a venue for state and civil society actors alike to discuss and gain understanding of the growing need to empower communities and problematize the role of democratization in governance.

The result of these initiatives to examine, articulate, and disseminate new perspectives on local governance is an overabundance of instructional materials revolving around the theme of decentralization, which recognize and underscore the resolve to make local governance more democratic and efficient in delivering basic services to constituencies. Corollary to this is the trend of developing modules and instructional materials along the lines of “decentralized democratic governance.”

This assessment is part of an ongoing effort to identify the focus of and gaps in existing local governance training materials as well as to formulate recommendations as to what possible areas and aspects succeeding modules should cover and concentrate on to contribute to the body of knowledge and skills already developed by and included in previously conducted workshops and workshop materials. This paper is thus organized into three sections: methodology, findings, and recommendations. In addition, attached are five assessment

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4 Prepared by Sharon Quinsaat, Coordinator for INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT, Training on *Globalization and Democratic Governance* for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and academic Institutions at the Local Level, with research assistance from Sarah Jane Domingo and Miguel Afable.

5 University Researcher, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman.
sheets, where the concrete parameters used in reviewing different instructional materials are laid out.

**METHODODOGY**

At the initial stage, the researchers sorted through various agencies that run formal trainings on local governance for both local government officials and members of civil society. Only agencies with a pool of official trainers and experts and a course design were included as prospects. In the process, in order to have a sense of the nuances in the conduct of local governance courses, the researchers tried as much as possible to obtain at least one instructional material from organizations representing government, civil society, and academe. Unfortunately, however, institutional and legal reservations, including restrictions prescribed by intellectual property rights, held back most agencies such as the Center for Local and Regional Governance (CLRG) of the University of the Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG), the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP), the Institute of Popular Democracy (IPD), and the Local Government Academy (LGA), from lending their instructional materials to the researchers. Nevertheless, the researchers were able to review five different instructional materials obtained from four different organizations.

**FINDINGS**

1. **Learning Outcomes**

   Although the learning outcomes are not specifically stated in the materials reviewed, it can be deduced that their main objective, based on their content, is to equip government practitioners and private individuals the necessary governance tools they can apply in providing inputs to development plans of local governments. In particular, target participants are hoped to gain theoretical understanding of governance in general at the outset then put this into practice by applying and relating this to emerging themes such as good and democratic governance. Similarly, participants are expected to learn how formal and informal channels of governance can work together in implementing decisions and delivering basic services. Given this, it can also be inferred that current IMs do not point to any objective that underscores the relationship between globalization and governance. With the increasing challenges brought about by globalization, this is thus one important area to look into if any holistic understanding of governance in light of present circumstances is to be gained.

2. **Content/Knowledge**

   IMs reviewed converge on their definition and perception of governance as a process of coming up with decisions through state-civil society engagement. They affirm what has long been problematized in the discourse that governance is not the sole and exclusive domain of “governments.” In the same manner, the definition of governance as a process is extended to include such values as accountability, transparency, efficiency, fairness and citizens’ involvement as important features of governance at the local level. All of these were operationalized under the umbrella of “good and participatory governance,” reiterating the need of empowering the local through decentralization and devolution. On the other hand, while there is a good indication that current IMs have captured new themes of governance, they fail to map it within the framework of
globalization. In fact, no reference was given to globalization except a generic statement that it affects local government structures, pressuring them to improve their performance and reform their strategies to be more competitive globally. Hence, this confirms that IMs need to rethink its approach and shift its discussion from decentralization-devolution-democratization to how globalization impinges on governance. IMs also need to determine globalization’s implications on civilian participation to combat present challenges and anticipate further obstacles to it.

3. Form

Most of the instructional materials are in textbook-module form. Illustrations, diagrams, tables, charts and drawings along with case studies are helpful in articulating heavy concepts. Depending on the level of competence of the target participants, the use of heavy jargon is strongly discouraged as modules must be designed for the wider public.

4. Framework

With emphasis on participatory and efficient governance, the frameworks used are still within the themes of decentralized democratic governance and sustainable development. For instance, one of the major frameworks used is in line with community organizing known as COCO-BREAD, an approach that centers on the principles of development, democratic participation and advocacy work. IMs reviewed also introduced the Minimum Basic Needs (MBN) Approach, which prioritizes the quality of barangay life. Again, although these frameworks are undoubtedly helpful in guiding central actors in local governance, these should be understood and applied within the overarching framework of globalization. Any IM should take into account that governance now takes place in a different environment, with more and more external forces shaping it.

5. Tools

In facilitating democratized governance, where citizens have more space for participation, IMs reviewed encourage the use of the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Tools in developing, among others, barangay development plans. This tool is very important and appropriate in defining the particular needs of a community and in identifying concrete actions to meet these needs. This can help empower communities and aid local officials themselves in reaching and implementing decisions for their constituencies. Similarly, the very basic, yet useful Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) approach is also used.

6. Skills

Skills taught by the reviewed IMs are mostly technical in nature. These include, among others, the capacities to identify themes for possible projects, to formulate and plan project proposals, to do tax and administrative codification and to devise budget and development plans at the municipal and barangay levels.

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6 Collective, critical and creative consciousness-raising; Organizational development; Coalition-building and advocacy work; Overcoming gender and other biases; Basic services and infrastructure; Resource tenure improvement; Economic self-reliance and strengthening; Agricultural development and ecological nurturance; and Democratic participation and governance.
**RECOMMENDATIONS**

In order to complement as well as strengthen the outcomes of past and existing trainings and seminars on local governance, instead of completely starting afresh, it is recommended that the instructional materials to be used in the training on globalization and governance for local government units, civil society organizations, and academic institutions at the local level should include the following:

- **Learning outcomes should be stated clearly.** A key element in designing an effective instructional material (IM) is to carefully consider the expected learning outcomes, which should be stated explicitly at its beginning not only as a means of delineating the parameters of the material, but also as benchmark in monitoring or evaluating its impact afterward. Learning outcomes reflect the goals of the instructional designer. Often they are linked to the design of the training, wherein learning during training may be classified into one of three types of outcomes: cognitive, skill-based, and affective. In addition, each type of outcome includes particular categories and foci of measurement.

- **Since the material will be used for programmed and standardized instructions, its learning objectives must also be laid down at the outset.** In contrast to learning outcomes which are more holistic descriptions of the overall goal, objectives are strict and detailed statements which specify exactly the action that is to be assessed. If the material to be developed is stand-alone, the learning objectives should be competency-based.

- **IMs should be audience-appropriate.** Before designing the IM, apart from the course design and learning outcomes and objectives, it is imperative that the target audience be identified. If possible, a **clear user profile should be determined**, which include basic socio-demographic characteristics. This will be the basis for both form and content of the IM. In typifying the user, these questions should be considered:
  - What is his or her preferred language of instruction?
  - What themes, topics, and skills does he or she **want** to learn? What themes, topics, and skills **should** he or she learn, based on the nature of his or her work, etc.?
  - What is his or her level of competence (knowledge- and skill-based) on the issue?

- **For ease of use and understanding,** it is recommended that **IMs should be in textbook-module form** with the following characteristics:
  - Concepts or jargons used throughout the material should be defined at the beginning, in simple or layman’s terms.
  - If possible, heavy use of paragraphs should be avoided. Succinct explanations in bulleted form are encouraged.
  - Questions or processing exercises should be included in every session.
  - Visual aids should be used sensibly. These include flowcharts, tables, cartoons, and maps.

- **In defining and operationalizing globalization as a concept,** it should be situated within the devolution-decentralization-democratization discourse that guides any learning activity on local governance. Discussions on globalization could take off from these questions:
What is the relationship of the local to the global?
How are local governments, civil society, and communities affected by globalization?
How does globalization impinge on the processes of devolution, decentralization, and democratization?

An overarching framework on local governance within a globalized context must be developed.

- The IM on globalization and governance should capitalize on the tools for analysis and skills that are already established.
- IMs should cite previous instances in which the techniques they endorse have been previously effective.
- **In terms of accessibility and referencing:** The IM on globalization and governance must be within reach of the wider public, especially if targets members of civil society and participants from local government units. It should also cite its sources for reference and further validation of its participants.
- **In terms of organization:** The IM to be used must be organized according to the three main types of learning outcomes to be obtained from the training –cognitive, skill-based and affective- in order for the participants to easily retain what has been taught to them after they finish the course.
  - Since civil society groups and members of local government units differ in terms of the nature of skills they need, it is recommended that the IM allocate a separate section for each to avoid confusion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Title of Instructional Material:</strong></th>
<th>Empowering Local Governance Seminar Manual</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proponent:</strong></td>
<td>Empowering Civic Participation in Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>About the Proponent:</strong></td>
<td>Empowering Civic Participation in Governance (ECPG) is a nongovernment organization (NGO) working on village-level local governance.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Instructional Material:</strong></td>
<td>Textbook/Module</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Language:</strong></td>
<td>English</td>
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<td><strong>Brief Description of the Instructional Material:</strong></td>
<td><em>Empowering Local Governance Seminar Manual</em> is a primer or introductory reference material which focuses on salient features of local governance and administration, with special reference to the principles and modes of decentralization through the Local Government Code; venues of civic participation; and barangay-level legislation, fiscal and financial management, justice system, and development planning.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives:</strong></td>
<td>Not stated</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Learning Outcomes:</strong></td>
<td>Not stated</td>
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<td><strong>Contents and Authors:</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Notes on Good Local Governance by Gerry Bulatao</strong></td>
<td><strong>Civic Participation in Governance: Empowered Governance under the Local Government Code by Agustin Martin G. Rodriguez</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Barangay Enterprise Development Plan</strong></td>
<td><strong>A Modern Progressive Political Framework</strong></td>
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### Conceptualization of Governance:
- Adopted the definition of United Nations Economics and Social Council in the Asia-Pacific (UNESCAP) and The Global Campaign for Good Urban Governance of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP):
  - “…the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)”
  - “Governance can be used in several contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance…Since governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented, an analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved in decision-making and implementing the decisions made and the formal and informal structures that have been set in place to arrive at and implement the decision.”

- Governance as **not only government**:
  - “It is a process in which government agencies and officials, the corporate community and civil society all have a role, even as the formal leadership of this process is in the hands of duly elected or appointed officials.”

- Governance has **six key aspects**:
  - Citizen’s participation leading to empowerment and sustainability;
  - Accountability resulting in strengthening of legitimacy;
  - Transparency and integrity;
  - Fair and consensual conflict management within the ambit of law;
  - Operational efficiency; and
  - Value creation or positive socio-economic and environmental impact, especially for the poor.

### Conceptualization of/Reference to Globalization:
None

### Frameworks:
- Bipolar/Tripolar/Quadripolar Model of Society and State
- COCO-BREAD
- Class Analysis

### Tools for Analysis:
- Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Tools—resource, social, service, and transect mapping; seasonality diagram; pair-wise ranking; Venn diagram; historical transect; pie chart; flow chart; and organizational rating matrix.
- SWOTing
- Problem Tree
- Objective Tree
- Alternative Analysis
- Participation Analysis

### Skills Taught:
- Legislative Tracking and Codification
- Barangay Budgeting
Independently, the module is appropriate or understandable to mid-career professionals from the government and nongovernment organizations. It is heavy on jargon. There are few case studies and visual aids that could apply or illustrate the concepts.

**Title of Instructional Material:**
Enhancing Participation in Local Governance: Experiences from the Philippines

**Proponent:**
International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), Philippines-Canada Local Government Support Program (LGSP), and Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources Research and Development (PCARRD)

**About the Proponents:**
IIRR is a rural development organization, promoting people-centered development through capacity building for poor people and their communities, development organizations and agencies with 80 years experience, working in Africa, Asia and Latin America. LGSP is grounded in the Canadian International Development Agency’s Country Development Policy Framework (CDPF). This framework was developed through extensive consultation with Filipino government and non-government partners and outlines the framework for Canada's assistance to the Philippines. LGSP directly addresses the objectives of the CDPF, which entails promoting efficient, responsible, transparent and accountable governance at all levels in targeted regions in the Philippines. PCARRD is one of the five sectoral councils of DOST. It serves as the main arm of DOST in planning, evaluating, monitoring, and coordinating the national research and development (R&D) programs in agriculture, forestry, environment, and natural resources sectors. Its technical research divisions include crops, livestock, forestry and environment, agricultural resources management, and socioeconomics.

**Type of Instructional Material:**
Textbook

**Language:**
English

**Brief Description of the Instructional Material:**
Enhancing Participation in Local Governance: Experiences from the Philippines is a source book which documents stories of good local governance and features field-tested approaches from a wide range of local government initiatives and projects. It is divided into three major parts. Chapter I discusses the various perspectives and issues relating to broad concepts of decentralization, devolution, and governance. Chapter II shares some of the more successful experiences in public sector reform and the adoption of modern management approaches and techniques in the areas of local governance, including local development planning, as well as financial and disaster management. Finally, Chapter III highlights some successful experiences in other local development endeavors such as health service delivery, natural resources management and the promotion of local economic development.

**Objectives:**
Not stated

**Learning Outcomes:**
Not stated
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<td>• Good Governance for Genuine Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>• Public Sector Reform through Modern Management Approaches and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Exemplary Practices in Participatory Governance</td>
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<th>Conceptualization of Governance:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• No exact definition provided at the outset.</td>
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<td>• It can be inferred, however, that governance play a role in relation to the strengthening of local government units for national development. It cites several instances of participatory governance, in which the local government units (LGUs) work closely with citizens and other groups to more effectively implement government programs. Furthermore, decentralization and devolution are important concepts to be considered in any discussion on local governance.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Conceptualization of/Reference to Globalization:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• In the discussion under <em>The Local Government Code of 1991</em> under the sub-topic “Globalization and Local Government,” it was suggested that:</td>
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<td>o “Globalized competition induces vulnerability among nations whose industries and services cannot meet international standards of quality and cost-effectiveness/cost-competitiveness. Even public organizations, in as much as they shape policy and provide various kinds of support to private development activities, must meet these criteria to avoid becoming irrelevant.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o In relation to local governments, globalization has the following impacts on organizational improvement:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. It creates pressure to maximize organizational performance—organizations that ignore constant improvement lose out and eventually die down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It makes more people aware of the choices open to them—information technology enables a great segment of the population to be more informed of the activities of government and the economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Globally competitive organizations tend to be leaner, personnel-wise and management-wise—higher production is registered by companies even with lesser layers of management and sizes of human resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o The challenge to improve and develop local government organizations comes from the external environment as well as the additional responsibilities brought about by devolution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frameworks:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Devolution and Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainable Integrated Area Development (SIAD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tools for Analysis:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Human resources development and management of LGUs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fiscal administration and management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tax and administrative codification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Municipal and barangay level development planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Comments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Written in layman’s language and in summarized/outline forum, the module is user-friendly in form and content. It uses a lot of illustrations and case studies. Sources are further included at the end of each article. Each article can be read separately and can stand on its own.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Title of Instructional Material:**
Sama-Samang Pagsulong ng Kaunlaran sa Kanayunan! Isang Gabay sa Pagsasagawa ng Local Development Planning sa Pamamagitan ng Participatory Rural Appraisal

**Proponent:**
Kaisahan Tungo sa Kaunlaran ng Kanayunan at Repormang Pansakahan (KAISAHAN)

**About the Proponent:**
KAISAHAN is a social development organization involved in agrarian reform, local governance, and sustainable integrated area development.

**Type of Instructional Material:**
Textbook/Module

**Language:**
Filipino

**Brief Description of the Instructional Material:**
*Sama-Samang Pagsulong ng Kaunlaran sa Kanayunan! Isang Gabay sa Pagsasagawa ng Local Development Planning sa Pamamagitan ng Participatory Rural Appraisal* discusses local development planning as a governance tool in concept and praxis.

**Objective:**
To assist progressive barangay council members, individuals, and other institutions in crafting meaningful and comprehensive barangay development plans

**Learning Outcomes:**
Not stated

**Contents and Authors:**
- Pananaw sa Local Development Planning
- Ang Barangay
- Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)
- Barangay Development Planning through PRA

**Conceptualization of Governance:**
- Local governance integrates the concept and practice of democratization (*popular at aktibong pakikilahok sa pamamalakad ng barangay o komunidad*), devolution (*paglipat ng kapangyarihan, assets at resources sa mga local government units*), and decentralization (*paglipat ng administrative supervision at control mula sa national government tungo sa mga local government units*).

**Conceptualization of/Reference to Globalization:**
None

**Frameworks:**
- Participatory Rural Appraisal
- Development Planning
- COCO-BREAD

**Tools for Analysis:**
- PRA Tools—timeline, resource and social map, transect map, social census map, service map, seasonality diagram, Venn diagram, historical transect, organizational rating matrix, pair-wise ranking, pie chart, and flow chart

**Skills Taught:**
*Barangay Development Planning using PRA*
Title of Instructional Material:
Masters in Public Management Module in Governance for 2nd Semester, SY 2003-2004

Proponent:
Development Academy of the Philippines

About the Proponent:
The Development Academy is a government corporation with original charter created by Presidential Decree 205, amended by Presidential Decree 1061, and further amended by Executive Order 288. As such, the Academy is a government-owned and controlled corporation under the Executive Branch of the Republic of the Philippines, which offers, among others, a graduate program on Public Management as well as conducts trainings and workshops on seven main areas: sustainable human development, productivity for economic development, knowledge management, transparency and accountability in governance, democratic reforms, peace and prosperity in Mindanao and education for excellence.

Type of Instructional Material:
Expanded Syllabus/Course Outline

Language:
English

Brief Description of the Instructional Material:
The course delves on governance and its relation to development. It expounds the key concepts, elements and principles of good governance. It discusses the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which the public can express their needs and preferences, rights of groups and individuals are protected, and differences are resolved. The course draws on international and local good practices of governance.

Objectives:
To acquire both theoretical and practical understanding of the concepts, elements and principles of governance; to recognize the critical link between governance and a country’s development; to know the requisites of accountable, transparent and effective governance; and to get exposed on the various governance institutions and mechanisms and appreciate how they work.

Learning Outcomes:
To learn specific governance tools and strategies which can be adapted and applied to their respective agencies.

Contents and Authors:
- Course Introduction and Governance Perspectives (Market Failure: Definition and Types; Need for Government Intervention; Government vs. Governance) by Dr. Eduardo T. Gonzales
- Measures of Good Governance (Principles and Elements of Good Governance; Indicators of Good Governance) by Magdalena L. Mendoza
- Public Policy (Definition; Public Policy Process; Analytical Tools; Alternative Modes of Public Service Delivery; Stakeholders Analysis and Institutional Analysis) by Dr. Eduardo T. Gonzales and Ma. Antoinette G. Virtucio
- Improving Transparency and Accountability (Transparency, Accountability, Authority; Responsibility: Definition; Principal-Agent Theory; Checks and Balances; Introduction to Corruption: Types and Contours; Causes and Effects of Corruption; Anti-corruption strategies
and tools; Developing Anti-Corruption Program; Public Expenditure Management; Controlling Corruption in Revenue Agencies) by Dr. Segundo Romero, Magdalena L. Mendoza and Usec. Laura Pascua

- Public Ethics (Public Trust, Ethics Concepts, Ethics Infrastructure; Ethics Audit) by Ophel Tongco
- Performance-based Governance (Outcomes vs. Outputs; Output Management; Performance Evaluation; Benchmarking; Contestability) by Ma. Antonette Virtucio
- Fiscal Decentralization (Forms and Distribution of Power; Decentralization; Subsidiarity Principle; Expenditure Management; Revenue Authority; Intergovernmental Transfers) by Dr. Rosario G. Manasan
- Voice and Citizen Participation (Concept of Citizen’s Voice; Voice and Exit Mechanisms; Popular Participation in Decision-Making; Feedback Mechanisms and Citizen Accountability) by Dr. Segundo Romero
- Rule of Law (The concept of Rule of Law; Predictability and Consistency; People Power; Judicial Independence and Fairness; Judicial Efficiency; Judicial Reform Efforts) by Dr. Eduardo T. Gonzales and Atty. Lourdes Sereno
- Governance: The Missing Link in Poverty Reduction (Poverty Dimensions and Causes; Relationship Between Governance and Poverty Reduction; Social Spending; Social Protection and Safety Nets) by Magdalena L. Mendoza
- Corporate Governance (Corporate Governance: Definition and Concepts; Ownership Structures; Management and Decision Allocation; Public Ethics and Social Responsibility) by Magdalena L. Mendoza

**Conceptualization of Governance:**

- Defines governance as the manner by which political, economic and administrative power is exercised in the management of a country’s resources for development.

**Conceptualization of/Reference to Globalization:**

Not Stated

**Frameworks:**

Not Stated

**Tools for Analysis:**

Not Stated

**Skills Taught:**

None

**Other Comments:**

The syllabus is well-structured, where the objectives of the course are specifically laid out. The topics to be discussed are also stated in detail, giving students an idea of what to expect from the course. However, the absence of a list of required readings prevents students from gauging what possible frameworks are to be applied in understanding governance and related themes.

**Title of Instructional Material:**

Public Management and Governance

**Proponent:**

Development Academy of the Philippines

**About the Proponent:**

The Development Academy is a government corporation with original charter created by Presidential Decree 205, amended by Presidential Decree 1061, and further amended by Executive Order 288. As such, the Academy is a government-owned and controlled corporation under the Executive Branch of the Republic of the Philippines, which offers, among others, a
A graduate program on Public Management as well as conducts trainings and workshops on seven main areas: sustainable human development, productivity for economic development, knowledge management, transparency and accountability in governance, democratic reforms, peace and prosperity in Mindanao and education for excellence.

**Type of Instructional Material:**
Expanded Syllabus/Course Outline

**Language:**
English

**Brief Description of the Instructional Material:**
The course covers an overview of foundational theories, principles and practices in public management and governance; it explores the applications and actual practice of Philippine public management along key governance levels and sectors.

**Objectives:**
To enable the students to understand and appreciate foundational public management theories, concepts and principles and how these are actualized in the Philippine bureaucracy and other key governance entities; to identify and explain key public management theories –their historical roots, key principles and principal application; to describe how public management has been operationalized in the Philippines through the workings of various governance levels and key entities and through the experience of leading public management practitioners; and to be able to analyze the key issues attendant to the practice of public management in the Philippines and provide alternative approaches towards addressing these issues based on course lecturettes and individual readings on theories and principles, sharing sessions by key public management practitioners, and case studies.

**Learning Outcomes:**
Not stated

**Contents and Authors:**
- Theoretical Framework, Underlying Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices
- Towards an Accountable Government RA 6713
- Towards and Answerable Government “Delivering Results” Implementing Policies
- Towards an Accessible Government “Achieving Success”
- Towards a Socially Responsible Private Sector
- Partnerships Between Government and Private Sector
- Corporate Governance and Government
- Participation, Empowering Civil Society
- Partnership Between Government and Non-Government
- Citizen Responsibility in Governance–Towards the Office of the Citizen

**Conceptualization of Governance:**
Not Stated

**Conceptualization of/Reference to Globalization:**
Not Stated

**Frameworks:**
Not Stated

**Tools for Analysis:**
Not Stated

**Skills Taught:**
None

**Other Comments:**
Similarly, the syllabus contains a well-specified set of objectives and its form is simple enough to be understood by students.
Strengthening Local Capacity in Responding to the Challenges of Globalization: 
Training on *Globalization and Democratic Governance* for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and Academic Institutions at the Local Level

**TRAINING NEEDS ASSESSMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT**

Municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet

_Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo*

**INTRODUCTION**

Trainings are intended to enhance and/or complement existing capabilities of organizations and/or individuals. Prior to training implementation, a Training Needs Assessment (TNA) is conducted to systematically ascertain gaps between current and desired capacities to determine the training methodology appropriate in a particular context. For the *Certificate Course on Globalization and Democratic Governance*, the TNA seeks to provide a profile of prospective participants focusing on their: 1) knowledge on concepts such as “globalization,” “governance,” and “development;” 2) existing skills of prospective trainees in responding to issues brought about by globalization; and, 3) attitude towards the practice of democratic governance, which promote a relationship of dialogue and transparency among the various stakeholders in the local level.

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7 Prepared by Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo, TRAINING COORDINATOR AND TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS SPECIALIST, Training on *Globalization and Democratic Governance* for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, Academic Institutions at the Local Level.

8 The Third World Studies Center’s local partners as of November 25, 2005 include the Municipal Government of La Trinidad, Institute of Public Administration-Benguet State University, and the Diocese of Baguio-Benguet. The Cordillera People’s Alliance and the Governance and Policy Program of the Cordillera Studies Center of the University of the Philippines–Baguio are still deliberating on whether to take part in the project as local partners.

9 University Research Associate, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines–Diliman.
THE TNA INSTRUMENT

The semi-structured questionnaire is divided into four sections. The first section contains a brief profile of the respondent. The second part focuses on the respondent’s knowledge on the key concepts of globalization, governance and development. The third portion elicits the respondent’s perception of local realities in relation with globalization and governance. The last part of the questionnaire seeks to generate the respondent’s thoughts on the training methodology and related fees.

THE TNA PROCESS

Local partners randomly administered the instrument to elected or appointed local government officials or staff; members of nongovernment and people’s organizations (NGOs and POs); faculty members and research and extension personnel from various academic institutions; members of the Church; media practitioners; and, representatives from the business sector. The preference for respondents from predetermined sectors seeks to ensure that various stakeholders are represented in the exercise of profiling the needs of prospective trainees. Consequently, each partner institution committed to disseminate questionnaires to their designated sectors, as well as collect and forward the accomplished forms to the Third World Studies Center (TWSC) for processing.

Carrying out the TNA is not without its limitations. Time was among the foremost concern of the partners. While the partner-institutions have expressed their interest to take an active part in the project, previous commitments restrain them from immediately executing the TNA. Nonetheless, this did not deter the partners to take part in this crucial preliminary activity of the training project. Secondly, local processes and protocols need to be undergone to generate larger support for activities related to the training project, in this case for the identification of individuals willing to respond to the queries indicated in the survey instrument. To complement the partners’ effort in the conduct of the TNA, the TWSC conducted face-to-face interviews with select respondents from the academe who were able to accommodate the request for an interview. A
copy of the TNA instrument was likewise sent electronically to respondents who expressed preference to reply via the Internet. Notwithstanding the abovementioned constraints, the succeeding section provides the preliminary results generated from the key informant interviews conducted by the TWSC during the initial field visit last November 14 to 18, 2005, as well as accomplished questionnaires submitted between the periods of November 18 to 30, 2005. Questionnaires that are not submitted within the period of November 18 to 30, 2005 will still be processed and be included as additional input to Instructional Materials Development.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE BENGUET TRAINING NEEDS ASSESSMENT

1.0 Respondents' Insights on Their Existing Knowledge and Skills in the Context of Globalization

Based on the respondents' own evaluation of their existing knowledge and skills as public servants, academics, and development workers, it is important to be abreast with current concepts, issues and events to be able to respond to the challenges in the context of an increasingly globalized environment. Members of the academe from the fields of public administration and the social sciences, for instance, underscored the importance of constantly being updated on emerging constructs and phenomena such as globalization as input to their respective syllabi. Access to the Internet is a handy repository of information that has facilitated the process of building the stock of knowledge of the respondents. Some respondents who are engaged in research pointed weakness in terms of computer-related skills need to be overcome, specifically on the area of computer-aided data processing and analysis.

Respondents also pointed out that an objective presentation of globalization and its different dimensions is lacking at present, thus affirming the significance of holding an activity such as the Certificate Course. This is particularly the case for those who do not have access to training programs or seminars on globalization, majority of which are held in Metro Manila. Among these training/seminars on globalization include the
International Conference on Globalization sponsored by the Association of Schools of Public Administration in the Philippines (ASPAP), Globalization and Education, and a conference on globalization and nationalism. There were discussions on globalization and the World Trade Organization (WTO) during the First Vegetable Congress sponsored by the local government of La Trinidad. However, information presented in the conference is still perceived by some respondents as deficient. Respondents who have attended graduate school had the benefit of receiving formal instruction on globalization and related topics.

In relation to governance, there is an existing training program conducted by the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) of the Benguet State University (BSU) on building the capability of various local government units (LGUs) in the province in the areas of resource generation, fiscal management and technical writing among others. The project is a consortium of the Department of Interior and Local Government Provincial Office, and the Benguet provincial government.

2.0 KNOWLEDGE BASE AND PERCEIVED REALITIES ON GLOBALIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE

2.1 Globalization

Respondents define ‘globalization’ as “a process that has both positive and negative aspects,” which entails the “opening up of the economic (free trade), social and cultural dimensions” of national life that fosters interaction and interdependence between and among different countries. On the political front, attached to it are the concepts of “neocolonialism and imperialism in the guise of giving aids, loans or grants to poor countries.” As a tool, it is viewed as a “mechanism of capitalistic, imperialistic countries in ensuring that they won’t lose markets for their products through free trade.” Globalization, thus, has rendered governments of Third World countries weaker. Another way of looking at globalization is an emphasis on “ethnicity, nationalism, and resistance among victims of neocolonialism.” In the local context, globalization generally carries a negative connotation, owing to the fact that Benguet vegetable farmers have felt the crunch of the lowering of
2.1.1 Issues related to globalization

Having defined globalization, respondents were asked to identify its apparent consequences. Issues related to globalization pertain primarily to the government’s macroeconomic trade policies. These include the unprecedented acceleration of the lowering of tariffs and the absence of safeguards and government support for sectors adversely affected by trade liberalization. Some respondents even believe that, contrary to popular notion, the World Trade Organization (WTO) cannot be faulted for the negative impact of globalization on the Benguet vegetable industry. In fact, according to one respondent, rules under the multilateral trading body provides for the gradual opening up of the Philippine market up to the year 2020 as well as setting up safety nets. The lowering of tariffs is viewed as detrimental to the Benguet vegetable industry, especially in the context of the worsening cases of smuggling—technical or otherwise. Respondents also brought attention to the issue of local food sufficiency in light of the deteriorating state of the vegetable industry. Other issues identified are externally driven which include stringent phytosanitary measures of developed countries like Australia or Japan, which some consider as a form of trade barrier, and the advantage enjoyed by processed products, which impact the competitiveness of raw produce from the Philippines.

Another issue raised was regarding the government’s “lack of national policies supportive of industrial pursuits that could have strengthened local industries and encouraged the ingenuity and productivity of the Filipino.” This is but a reflection of the absence of a coherent industrial plan prior to integration in the world trading system. This is exacerbated by the absence of synergy between efforts of the local government to promote and strengthen local industries with the national government’s development agenda for the Philippines to attain the status of being a “globally competitive” country, which to some is “just rhetoric.”
Respondents also view migration or overseas employment as one consequence of globalization.

**Positive and negative manifestations of globalization**

Dichotomizing the positive and negative manifestations of globalization facilitated the respondents’ views regarding globalization and its different dimensions (economic, social, cultural, political, and technological). The table below summarizes the articulations of the respondents:

Table1. Positive and negative manifestations of the different dimensions of globalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Globalization</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **ECONOMIC**               | 1. Entry of foreign investments in the province that create jobs for the locals as in the case of the mining and the semiconductor industries  
2. Boost in local tourism  
3. Promotion of local entrepreneurship  
4. Cheap imported products that allows consumers to choose from various products  
5. Overseas employment | 1. Entry of cheap products, specifically vegetables, has left some farmers without livelihood.  
2. Dumping of products from the US, China and other countries.  
3. Opening up the extractive industries that endanger the environment. |
| **POLITICAL**              | 1. Electorate is more discerning in choosing local leaders. Preference is given to leaders who have both the skill and knowledge to govern. | 1. Outmigration of the productive population due to mismatch in existing skills of locals with the required skills and know–how of investors.  
2. Focus on educating our citizens in the fields of information technology (IT) when, in fact, majority of the population |
<p>| <strong>SOCIAL</strong>                 | 1. Appreciation for collective action, particularly for the Ibalois who are known to be a “closed” culture, in the context of responding to the negative impact of globalization. | 1. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of Globalization</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CULTURE</td>
<td>1. Sharing of “best practice” experiences with other cultures.</td>
<td>1. Foreign culture has started to infringe on local culture where local values and traditions are lost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Cultural integration that promotes openness to other cultures yet an emphasis on ethnicity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Innovativeness, creativeness and resourcefulness of local vegetable farmers to make their products more competitive in the market.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNOLOGY</td>
<td>1. Sharing of technology wherein the Philippines, for instance, can adopt technologies that may be appropriate in the local context</td>
<td>1. Piracy of technology developed by local scientists due to poor intellectual property mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Uneven playing field where the more advanced countries have more advantage in technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Adopting technologies that are not attuned to Philippine realities such as promoting interactive learning in the rural areas where there are no computers or the population is computer illiterate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.2 Coping with globalization

In terms of coping with the adverse impact of globalization, respondents have identified strategies or mechanisms that, in their opinion, will cushion further damage from being experienced by the country's vulnerable sectors. These mechanisms center primarily on the national government’s ability to flex its political muscles in a world where the role of the state, particularly of developing countries, is relegated to a mere spectator in the intramurals of their more developed counterparts during trade negotiations under the WTO. In the local level, respondents view the national government as too eager to implement neoliberal policies at the expense of its agricultural and industrial sectors. Despite the disappointment
expressed by respondents on the national government’s performance, they still see the state as playing a central role in the economy. On the national level, respondents believe that if we intend to be competitive in the global arena, the government should first ensure that our local industries will be able to compete with their more advanced counterparts in developed countries through implementation of policies and ordinances that are not inimical to the welfare of local farmers and businessmen. Specifically, respondents suggest the following measures:

1. Installing the necessary safety nets such as subsidies for farm inputs for farmers, funding for researches that can aid developing cheaper inputs such as seeds and fertilizers to help farmers produce competitive products;
2. Maintaining a relatively competitive tariff rates for vegetables to help farmers cope with the negative effects of opening up trade;
3. Zoning of vegetable farming to avoid glutting the market with the same produce;
4. Provision of physical infrastructure, which can contribute to the lowering of production costs thus, making the prices of products competitive;
5. Setting up mechanisms to protect the academe's intellectual property, specifically in developing new farm technologies to enhance our farmers’ productivity; and,
6. Implementation of stringent phytosanitary measures to ensure that food is safe for human consumption and as a way to protect the vegetable industry.

Respondents also underscored the importance of forming a coalition of various farmers groups with the support of the local and provincial governments to collectively advance the concerns of the industry. This responsiveness of local and provincial governments should also be complemented by a well-informed and empowered citizenry as well as links with nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and foreign governments.

A respondent who is a member of the academe proposes a rethinking of the focus of Philippine education. Our educational system, specifically our curriculum, should not only strengthen our people’s skills and knowledge in
the fields of mathematics, science, and information technology. Instead, it should also encourage Filipino ingenuity and technological creativity to enable the Philippines to develop technology that are more sensitive and appropriate to local realities.

2.2 Governance

Respondents’ answers indicate that governance can either be good or bad. In stressing good governance, the concept is characterized by consultation of local government with various stakeholders such as NGOs, business sector, and marginalized sectors that include women, children, and indigenous peoples (IPs) to promote empowerment. Another aspect of governance that respondents highlighted is transparency. One respondent’s more pragmatic view of governance is being in power and being able to provide leadership, but which can be used to “control and manipulate people to advance one’s aim.”

The respondents are unanimous in saying that the local government of La Trinidad can be characterized as being open to concerns of various sectors in the municipality, thus considering it as democratic. In terms of civil society participation in local special bodies, which is enshrined in the Local Government Code, people’s organizations (POs) are more active than NGOs, particularly in the barangay level. Aside from the formal structures of government, some barangays still make use of indigenous social structures when it comes to governing their constituencies to amicably settle conflicts. In responding to the challenges faced by the Benguet vegetable industry with the onslaught of globalization, strong cooperation among the different stakeholders—producer groups, traders, the academe and the local government—was observed when the local and provincial governments together with farmers and local business groups lobbied the Tariff Commission to decelerate the lowering of tariff of imported vegetables. NGOs, POs, and academic institutions are also involved in planning and implementation of significant projects and programs for the welfare of the citizenry. Public consultation, seminars and trainings are initiated by both government and nongovernment institutions to ensure the successful implementation of programs/projects in the province.
While local governance is described as consultative, respondents enunciated dissatisfaction with the way the national government has undertaken trade liberalization. First, national policies are perceived to be contrary with local development goals. Second, there is an ostensible retreat of the national government in protecting local industries from the caprices of the market. Despite the neoliberal prescription of the diminished role of the state, respondents still consider the role of the national government as crucial especially in the context of globalization by crafting policies that promote and enhance local industries. Local governments could likewise lessen their dependence on the national government for resources and instead strengthen their capacity to direct local development.

2.3 Development

“Development’ is viewed both as a concept and practice. As a concept, it is defined as “a significant change in one’s life conditions but...not necessarily geared towards improvement.” Changes can occur in the economic, political or social structures as well as come in the form of technological innovations. It can also be related to the “spiritual improvement.” As opposed to the view limited to the improvement of the physical or infrastructure and economic aspects, development in practice should include shifts in social and cultural dimensions of the individual and the larger community (holistic and human-centered development).

3.0 Training Methodology and Other Related Matters

3.1 Expectations on a training course on globalization and governance

First, the training will be useful especially if the positive and negative impact of globalization will be discussed to enable local stakeholders to “come up with solutions.” This will also help participants widen their knowledge about the impact of globalization and correct the misconceptions about globalization. The course will likewise aid local governments in planning measures to respond to the challenges of globalization. For participants from the academe, the course can inspire the conduct of researches on governance and globalization, which will be useful in policy
formulation. Skills that can be learned in the course will also help various stakeholders to strategize on how local proposals can be conveyed effectively to the national government and can be considered in decision making in relation to trade policies. Second, democratic governance as part of the training curriculum will also be helpful particularly for the local officials to further encourage consultation with their constituencies.

Graduates of the course are expected to gain knowledge and skills to enable them to practice what is accepted internationally (in terms of competing and coping with globalization in the social, economic and cultural aspects).

3.2 Preferred method/s in the conduct of the training

Preference for English as the language of instruction was articulated by the respondents. Lecture and discussion of approximately 18 hours and a 36-hour interactive/hands-on method is considered to be a more effective training method as this allows participants to actively learn from one another. Other favored training methodologies are problem-solving type of activities and multimedia-based instruction as well as provision of notes and manuals to serve as reference for participants.

3.3 Suggested topics

The following topics were also suggested by the respondents:
1. Discussion on the local case studies such as the mining industry and TWSC’s study on the Benguet vegetable industry;
2. Discussion on provisions of various local and national legislations as well as the WTO provisions so that participants can have more understanding regarding the legal aspect of the country’s trade liberalization policy; and,
3. A very objective presentation of globalization, both its positive and negative aspects and the various dimensions of globalization.

3.4 Training fees

Respondents said that trainings such as the Certificate Course on Globalization and Democratic Governance can cost an average of P2,000 per
participant. One respondent believes that the course can charge up to P10,000 or an equivalent of P250 per hour course with a maximum of 25 trainees to ensure that each student has the opportunity to interact closely with other participants.

Only two respondents, though, expressed their willingness to pay for the full training fee. If fees are going to be charged, subsidy from their respective institutions is going to be needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on preliminary results of the TNA, the Certificate Course on Globalization and Democratic Governance comes at an opportune time for various stakeholders in the province of Benguet. While there is recognition that the local government of La Trinidad and the provincial government have collectively responded to the negative impact of globalization on the vegetable industry, the respondents still sees a need to objectively discuss the phenomenon of globalization to deepen their knowledge on the advantages and disadvantages of a globalized context. This will enable them to respond accordingly in the local level.

But strengthening local capacities should be complemented with an engagement with the national. This is one area where local stakeholders have a rich experience but should be further enhanced and reinforced. A retrospective exercise will help trainees to objectively assess their experience of engaging the national as the experience can provide lessons that may be useful in future collective undertakings. To complement this initial TNA exercise, a diagnostic of participants should be conducted to further refine inputs generated from this activity.

Below is a summary of needs as identified by the respondents in terms of content and method of instruction of the training:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On the Concept of globalization</td>
<td>Lecture-discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Different dimensions of</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Positive and negative aspects of globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**On the Concept of governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local, national and international legislations related, but not limited to, economic globalization</th>
<th>Lecture-discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative spaces available to local stakeholders</td>
<td>Workshop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating synergy between the local and the national</td>
<td>Problem-solving exercises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Local Case Studies**

| Benguet vegetable industry case study | Presentation of case study prepared by TWSC |
| Mining industry | Workshop |
| | Problem-solving exercises |

**OUTPUT:** Comprehensive Provincial Action Plan
ATTENDANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CABILO, Zuraida Mae D.</td>
<td>Third World Studies Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DACUMOS, Sharon P.</td>
<td>Municipal Planning and Development Office, La Trinidad, Benguet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTEBAN, William H.</td>
<td>Municipal Councilor, La Trinidad, Benguet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAWID, Jorge</td>
<td>Office of the Mayor, La Trinidad, Benguet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TICBAEN, Felicitas D.</td>
<td>Local Government of La Trinidad, Benguet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TINDO, Erlinda B.</td>
<td>Diocese of Baguio-Benguet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AGENDA OF THE MEETING

1. Discussion of Project Details
2. Discussion of the Terms of Partnership through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
3. Preparatory Activities (Training Needs Analysis, Logistical Concerns)
4. Tasking and Schedules

DISCUSSION OF PROJECT DETAILS

• On the objectives of the training project

The training project as conceptualized by the Third World Studies Center seeks to build and pool together knowledge and skills of, as well as facilitate meaningful exchange among, the different stakeholders to enable the crafting of a multisectoral action plan to respond accordingly to the challenges posed by globalization.

• On content, method of instruction and other related matters

Initially, partners suggested that there should be a discussion on both the positive and negative impact of globalization to help participants to objectively assess processes and issues related to it and respond appropriately. The experience of Benguet in coping with the negative effects of globalization on the local vegetable industry should likewise be part of the discussion as this may be useful for participants to reflect on the experience as well as provide lessons to other local government units. The study done by the TWSC on the Benguet vegetable industry can be presented to illustrate this. An emphasis on the achievements of local initiatives should also be included.

Another equally important throughput of the training is to be able to communicate whatever action plan that may be drafted to the national government as input in macroeconomic decision making. Partners expressed, though, that adjustments may need to be made in terms of the duration of the training because their experience show that participants usually find it difficult to sit through a five-day training, especially if the training venue is within the municipality.
On target participants

Target training participants are from the local government, academe, media, business sector, civil society organizations. Prospective trainees representing the local government, though, should not be limited to the municipality of La Trinidad. Representatives from other local government units (LGUs) from the province of Benguet should be invited to come up with a more comprehensive course of action to cope with both positive and negative effects of globalization.

The partners also noted that charging a registration fee would discourage participants to take part in the training.

Comments on TNA instrument

The rationale behind the open-ended questions is to get responses that are as qualitative as possible to give respondents more liberty to express their thoughts. Partners, on the other hand, stated that they prefer a multiple-choice questionnaire because some respondents may not have the luxury of time to fill out an open-ended questionnaire. The TWSC can also provide the partners an electronic copy of the questionnaire so that they can send it out to respondents who would prefer to answer it electronically.

For the dissemination of the questionnaire, it was suggested that the TWSC prepare a cover letter introducing the project and the TNA to respondents so that the partners can endorse it.

TERMS OF PARTNERSHIP

- Each institution will be signing an individualized Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the TWSC. The MOU will detail the roles and responsibilities of the respective partners.
- The following are the initial agreements among partners:
  - The local government (LG) of La Trinidad can provide funding for the transportation of participants representing other municipalities in the province, the business sector and the media to and from the venue, if the training is held within the province. It was suggested that two representatives from each municipality may be invited. The LG of La Trinidad will also be inviting representatives from the Benguet Press Corporation.
  - The Institute of Public Administration (IPA)-Benguet State University (BSU) can take charge of arrangements related to the training venue.
  - Diocese of Baguio-Benguet will invite representatives from their partner indigenous people’s organizations.
  - TWSC will prepare the revised MOU, the proposed counterpart being requested from the local government, and the cover letter for the invitations for participants and the LGU will endorse the invitation.
  - For the TNA, each partner will disseminate and collect the survey questionnaire to the sector/s assigned to them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution/Activities</th>
<th>TNA</th>
<th>Training Preparations</th>
<th>Training Implementation</th>
<th>Monitoring and Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third World Studies Center</td>
<td>Prepare Training Needs Assessment (TNA) instrument</td>
<td>Coordinate all preparatory activities with local partners</td>
<td>Prepare the draft Monitoring and Evaluation (M &amp; E) instrument</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process results of the TNA</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare TNA Report</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government of La Trinidad</td>
<td>Host the Partners’ Planning-Workshop</td>
<td>Identify participants from: Benguet LGUs, media, business sector</td>
<td>Assist in the logistical preparations of the training in terms of equipment and supplies among others</td>
<td>Assist the TWSC in conducting project M &amp; E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify respondents for the TNA from other local government units (LGUs) in Benguet, members of the media and the business sector</td>
<td></td>
<td>Provide for transportation allowance of participants to and from the training venue within the province of Benguet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administer the TNA instrument to the designated respondents (see above)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify respondents for the TNA from civil society organizations including, but not limited to NGOs and POs</td>
<td>Identify participants from: Benguet-based civil society organizations including, but not limited to, NGOs and POs from indigenous people’s communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administer the TNA instrument to the designated respondents (see above)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diocese of Baguio-Benguet/Social Action Center</td>
<td>Identify respondents for the TNA from the academe</td>
<td>Identify participants from the academe (faculty and research and extension staff from the fields of Public Administration and the Social Sciences)</td>
<td>Cover expenses related to training venue as well as equipment needed for the duration of the training</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administer the TNA instrument to the designated respondents (see above)</td>
<td>Identify and recommend prospective trainers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Institute of Public Administration-Benguet State University</td>
<td>Identify venue and make the necessary arrangements</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES, TASKING AND SCHEDULES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>DEADLINE</th>
<th>TWSC</th>
<th>LGU</th>
<th>IPA-BSU</th>
<th>Diocese/SAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revise TNA questionnaire Revise MOU and TOR Cover letter for TNA Questionnaire</td>
<td>November 15, 2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribute TNA questionnaire</td>
<td>November 16 to December 7, 2005</td>
<td>25 respondents from: 1. Benguet municipalities 2. Business sector 3. Media</td>
<td>15 respondents from: 1. Faculty of Public Administration, Social Sciences 2. Research &amp; Extension staff</td>
<td>10 respondents from Benguet-based NGOs and POs, church</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of accomplished TNA questionnaires</td>
<td>December 9, 2005 (Friday)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed MOU and TOR</td>
<td>December 2, 2005 (Friday)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training budget indicating proposed counterpart of partners</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minutes of meeting</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Prepared by:

Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo  
Training Coordinator, TWSC Certificate Course on Globalization and Democratic Governance  
University Research Associate, Third World Studies Center
Strengthening Local Capacity in Responding to the Challenges of Globalization:  
Training on Globalization and Democratic Governance for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and Academic Institutions at the Local Level

Tentative Design of Local Case Studies Module\textsuperscript{10}  
Joel Fajardo Ariate Jr.

Rationale

In the course of the training program, after discussing key concepts like globalization, development, governance, and democracy, it will be necessary to provide specific examples that would render these concepts more meaningful for the participants. A session where participants would be able to create and discuss Local case studies will best serve this purpose.

The use of local case studies to illustrate concepts and processes “provides an opportunity for activity and decision making related to realistic situations” (Goodman et al. 1977, 15). But it is more than learning from experience. “A case takes the raw material of first-order experience and renders it narratively into a second-order experience. A case is the re-collected, re-told, re-experienced and reflected version of a direct experience. The process of remembering, retelling, reliving and reflecting is the process of learning from experience” (Shulman 1996, 208).

Learning objectives

Smith and Ragan mentioned that “intellectual skill outcomes are the predominant objectives of instruction in both school and training settings” (2005, 80). The particular intellectual skill that the module would like to have as a learning outcome for the trainee is ability to assess particular occurrences in a given locale and then to identify particular concepts and processes embedded in these events. This kind of objective is called concept objective, a learning objective that reflects “the learners’ ability to classify and label ideas, objects, and events as examples/ nonexamples of a concept. They may require that the learner state how/why such classification was made” (Smith and Ragan 2005, 99).

\textsuperscript{10} Prepared by Joel Ariate Jr., University Research Associate of the Third World Studies Center, and member of the INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT Team, Training on Globalization and Democratic Governance for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and Academic Institutions at the Local Level.
Thus, the trainees, upon completion of this module will be able to:

Identify and discuss previously taught concepts, e.g., globalization, development, governance, and democracy as they transpire in the local case studies.

Identify and discuss the interrelatedness of these concepts as they are played out in the case studies.

Identify and discuss the previously mentioned concepts and their interrelatedness in their own local settings.

Instructional strategy

With a concept objective, this module will then employ a particular strategy suited to this particular learning objective. There are two general strategies in doing concept instruction: the inquiry and the expository approach. The inquiry strategy “presents examples and nonexamples of the concepts of the concept and prompts the learner to induce or ‘discover’ the concept underlying the instance” (Smith and Ragan 2005, 175). The expository strategy “presents the concept, its label, and its critical attributes earlier in the lesson sequence” and the examples and nonexamples follow later (Smith and Ragan 2005, 175). The module favours the inquiry strategy since the expository approach will be employed during the prior sessions when the basic key concepts like globalization, development, governance, and democracy will be taught.

Module design

Three case studies that focus on agricultural trade liberalization, sustainable development, and the transnational movement of labour and capital as they affect particular locales will be presented to the trainees.

The local case studies will be presented in a concise narrative form, possibly as feature articles.

The local case study narratives will be provided in advance to the trainees; it will be part of their training-seminar tool kit.

The lecturer/course facilitator will discuss with the trainees the contexts of the local studies during the training session.

Learning strategy

Concept trees, analogies, mnemonics and imagery are the learning strategies usually associated with concept learning (Smith and Ragan 2005, 178-180). For this module, a modified concept tree will be used.
The trainees will be randomly assigned by the lecturer/course facilitator into three groups. With the expected 30 trainees in the class, each group will have at least 10 members.

Each group will be made to choose one local case study. The group will then identify from the narrative of the local case study events and processes that correspond to the concepts of globalization, development, governance, and democracy.

After identifying the events and processes corresponding to the key concepts being studied in the training-seminar, the trainees will now proceed to draw linkages between the events and processes on the one hand, and among the key concepts on the other.

Then, looking at their own local area, they will provide parallel examples and also draw linkages among them.

Each group’s output will be presented to the class for comments and reactions.

References


Sample Case Study


Contours of the Vegetable Sector in Benguet in the Era of Trade Liberalization

The province of Benguet located in the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) has dominated the local production and trade of semi-temperate vegetables\(^{11}\) earning the moniker, “Salad Bowl of the Philippines.” Prior to the development of the vegetable industry, however, most of Benguet agriculture was devoted to the production of rice, *camote* (sweet potato), and *gabi* (taro) for local consumption. Although the Spaniards introduced the production of cabbage and potato in the mid-1800s, farming was limited, small-scale, and household-oriented until the late 1920s. The Americans further developed this during their

\(^{11}\) Semi-temperate vegetables include broccoli, cabbage, carrot, cauliflower, celery, lettuce, mushroom, and potato.
colonial rule due largely to the mining boom and growth of logging companies in the area. However, two important factors ushered in commercial interest in semi-temperate vegetables in Benguet—the presence of Japanese and Chinese nationals who had knowledge of the technology for vegetable farming, and the construction and opening of the Halsema Road, which enabled the growth and expansion of production and trade (Reyes-Boquiren 1989, Lewis 1992). From this time on, the vegetable industry has increasingly become substantially important to the economy of Benguet.12

Vegetable farming in Benguet is capital intensive and at times involves “an elusive interplay of skill, fortitude and luck” (Lewis 1992, 118). First, there are production-related factors which are beyond the control of the farmers. One alarming trend related to low volume of production is the decreasing area planted to vegetables due mainly to declining fertility of the land (owing to long years of use) and erosion, and land use and/or crop conversion, such as shift to planting of ornamental plants (Aquino 2003). Next, in the case of cost of production, farm inputs alone require a substantial amount of capital. Machinery, seeds and chemicals are often imported.13 Benguet farmers have been importing American, Japanese and European hybrid seeds since the 1960s, which produce top quality cauliflower, broccoli, carrots, potatoes and cabbages (Cabreza and Caluza 2002). Because of inadequate farm extension and other support services from the government, farmers resort to, and are at the mercy of, abusive informal moneylenders.14

Production forms only half of the farmers’ expenditures. Farmers have to wrestle with high transport costs, which usually take a large share of total costs in post-harvest, especially for highland vegetables. Poor farm-to-market roads, inadequate storage, and inferior market information system result in under- and over-supply and spoilage.15 Price fluctuations are also a common problem of farmers, regardless of the type of crop. Due to limited access to reliable market information and a multi-layered marketing channel, farmers are reliant on traders who dictate the farmgate prices of their produce, which are usually low.16 High costs of packaging their produce, high rental of stalls and stands, low quality of products, limited research and development, lack of modern/appropriate marketing technology and varieties, and weak (or lack of) producer organizations that could effectively market the vegetables directly to the consumers are also challenges that farmers deal with (Aquino 2003). Adding to

12 Vegetable farmers in Benguet supply from 20 to 25 percent of the total vegetable needs of the Philippines (Ilagan 2003). The province accounts for 67 percent of the volume of production of white potato, 64 percent of cabbage, and 75 percent of carrots for the whole country in 2000 (Philippine Institute for Development Studies [PIDS] 2004). Northern Benguet towns produce 20 tons of carrots and 50 tons of potatoes a day (Dumlao 2002). In terms of employment, in the rural areas, 60 percent of Benguet’s 322,000 farmers get their livelihood from vegetable farming (Alcantara 2001; Cabreza 2002a), representing up to 40,000 farm families (Cabreza 2002a).

13 Actually, Lewis (1992) claims, “the Benguet vegetable farmers became entangled in the world market economy not primarily as producers for a global market, but rather as consumers of agricultural supplies produced in the metropolitan states,” (143-144) dominated by Hoechst and Bayer (German), Shell (Anglo-Dutch) and Union Carbide (American).

14 In Cordillera, many vegetable farmers source their capital from a landholder or trader, usually a close friend or relative. Some own the land they till, while others work as tenants or rent the land for cultivation. Farmers buy inputs either from traders or middlemen in trading posts, and sell their produce to the same trader. The trader would naturally get half of the farmer’s earnings (Ibon 2003).

15 Thirty to fifty percent of vegetables are registered as post-harvest losses (Ibon 2003).

16 For example, in 2000, while the farmgate price of carrots was pegged at PhP 16.33 per kilo in Benguet, its retail price in its primary market, Manila, is PhP 43.70 per kilo (PIDS 2004).
these supply-side factors is the declining share on household food expenditures of vegetables.17

Due to its geographic location, the province of Benguet is also vulnerable to natural disasters. In July 2001, one of the worst tropical storms to hit the Philippines—Feria (Utor)—hit Northern Luzon, destroying infrastructure and devastating rice and vegetable farms. Trade was disrupted in Benguet, as the province was temporarily isolated due to landslides and floods, which rendered major routes impassable. The calamity created a shortage in the supply of semi-temperate vegetables, inducing traders and retailers to seek alternative sources to meet the demands of the markets and consumers. This opened a Pandora’s Box, as what started as an emergency or stopgap scheme developed into a recurrent then finally permanent practice.

Not fully recovered from Feria’s rampage, Benguet faced another outpouring; this time, of cheap and high quality imported vegetables. Since 2001, farmers in Benguet have been articulating that the scourge of cheap imports has become the main threat to their livelihood, if not to their very chance of survival. Indeed, from the last quarter of 2001 to 2002, the farmers of CAR, especially Benguet, were inundated, as the country imported about US$ 6.4 million (PhP 328.7 million) worth of fresh/chilled vegetables as compared to US$ 5.8 million (PhP 295 million) the previous year, according to figures from the National Statistics Office (NSO). In general, imports grew by three percent on volume and 10 percent on value. Notable is the 1,925 percent growth in quantity for carrots, 102 percent for head lettuce, 97 percent for cauliflower and headed broccoli, and 94 for cabbage, from 2001 to 2002 (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics [BAS] 2003); all of which are also produced locally (See Table 1). Data provided by the NSO and PIDS show a 152 percent increase in the average volume of imported fresh vegetables from 40,419 metric tons in 1991-1994 to 101,659 in 1995-2001.18

Table 1. Volume (in kilograms) and Percentage Growth from Previous Year of Selected Imported Semi-temperate Vegetables, 1998-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity (fresh/chilled)</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Vegetable Imports</td>
<td>144,639,221</td>
<td>191,494,671</td>
<td>1,924,244,095</td>
<td>227,941,098</td>
<td>180,256,455</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabbage (in-quota)</td>
<td>5,410</td>
<td>236,930/ (32%)</td>
<td>1,451/ (905%)</td>
<td>35,742/ (-88%)</td>
<td>69,422/ (94%)</td>
<td>83,210/ (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabbage lettuce (head lettuce)</td>
<td>27,944</td>
<td>118,349/ (324%)</td>
<td>150,983/ (28%)</td>
<td>84,917/ (-44%)</td>
<td>171,186/ (102%)</td>
<td>165,980/ (-3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrot</td>
<td>6,178</td>
<td>18,404/ (198%)</td>
<td>57,175/ (211%)</td>
<td>31,956/ (-44%)</td>
<td>646,966/ (1,925%)</td>
<td>1,346,560/ (108%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celery other than celeriac</td>
<td>22,215</td>
<td>7,933/ (-64%)</td>
<td>17,410/ (119%)</td>
<td>24,105/ (38%)</td>
<td>5,511/ (-77%)</td>
<td>1,750/ (-68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cauliflower and headed broccoli</td>
<td>153,992</td>
<td>112,301/ (-27%)</td>
<td>6,725,781/ (5,889%)</td>
<td>309,590/ (-95%)</td>
<td>609,724/ (97%)</td>
<td>270,560/ (-56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lettuce</td>
<td>302,105</td>
<td>309,884/ (3%)</td>
<td>691,172/ (123%)</td>
<td>369,197/ (-47%)</td>
<td>215,393/ (-42%)</td>
<td>139,640/ (-35%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 Domestic demand and consumption of vegetables in lowland areas has been decreasing by forty to sixty percent since 1999 (Ibon 2003).
18 Potato is the leading vegetable imported, with 13 percent.
The most conspicuous outcome of the downpour of imports is depressed market price. Being a major market of cheap vegetable imports, Manila may serve as a benchmark in the pricing system. With a highly layered marketing system dominated by monopoly traders, prices of cheap imports may be used as leverage to further depress farmgate prices (Morilla 2003). Most farmers have been inclined to sell their cash crops at a loss to Metro Manila markets to cope with the crisis.\(^{19}\) The entry of cheap imported vegetables caused the province Benguet to incur heavy losses with an estimate of PhP 2 billion in failed transactions between July and August 2002 alone (Requejo 2002). In a study conducted by Tagarino and Siano (2003), about 80 percent of 608 farmers in Benguet and Mountain Province ascribe their losses to imported vegetables. Price alone, however, does not capture its effects. Equally important are the often-overlooked impact on the psyche and morale of farmers, and on family and community relations. Eighty-eight (88) percent of the respondents have registered extreme discouragement to continue vegetable farming and acknowledged the exigency of engaging the state.

**Key Elements Affecting State-Civil Society Relations**

In the policy process, civil society, particularly stakeholders, engages the state or vice versa in setting the agenda, influencing the formulation and adoption of a policy, and monitoring and assessing the implementation of policy in terms of achieving its objectives. However, there are certain factors that may impinge on the likelihood of this interaction, courses of action, and purported outcomes, specifically on the realm of policy reforms. For this particular case study, these are: divergences among the parties involved at the rudimentary level of problem identification and interpretation, intricacies of the policy in question, and a mixture of civil society players with disparate tactics and interests.

**Pinpointing the Problem: Variances in Analysis**

Recognition and understanding of the problem is a critical first step in state-civil society engagement. It identifies who should be engaged, what are the prospects and setbacks, and how effective are the techniques to be employed. Likewise, it delineates the parameters for interaction, offers a clear-cut focus, and sets the elements of a strategy. With regard to the Benguet vegetable industry, there are three predominant interpretations of the situation, mainly centering on the causes of its ailing performance in the domestic market—smuggling, [Note: The table content is not transcribed here.]

\(^{19}\) Retailers were forced to sell their commodities at much lower prices than their imported counterparts. Normally, during typhoons in early July, prices of vegetables tripled, with potatoes at PhP 60.00 a kilogram, cabbage at PhP 50 a kilo, and carrots at PhP 60 a kilo. When buyers from Metro Manila began refusing Benguet vegetables in favor of the imported variety, the prices went down to PhP 15.00 a kilo for potatoes and PhP 20.00 a kilo for cabbage (Cimatu 2002).
tariff reduction, and absence of safety nets. Among those who see the problem as a result of aggressive reduction of tariff rates, they are polarized between those who consider this policy as directed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and those who think that it is a unilateral action by the government.

**Smuggling: the proverbial culprit**

Since 82 percent of the total volume of fresh/chilled imports in 2002 originated from China (Macabasco 2003), a country still in the process of acceding to the WTO at the same time forging a free trade agreement with member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), smuggling was easily identified as the nemesis. However, the relationship between agricultural trade liberalization and smuggling is incongruous. When a commodity is protected, with high tariffs and quota restrictions, the importation of such becomes costly, making smuggling an economical recourse; thus the belief that the old problem of smuggling is not, in any way, a function of free trade. Furthermore, unlike importation, which is authorized through government laws and policies, smuggling is a criminal offense, often linked to poor enforcement of customs regulations and corrupt practices of government officials.

There are two kinds of smuggling: outright, which does not require documentation such as import permits; and, technical, which takes place through undervaluation, underdeclaration of the volume shipped, misclassification and diversion of cargo (Francia 2004). Technical smuggling is the main way in which goods are brought into the country. But it cannot exist without the collusion of unscrupulous traders and corrupt government personnel and officials (Bacalla 2004). This was often the case for vegetables. Smuggled vegetables pose a much bigger threat than legally imported produce as they imperil not only the source of income of farmers, but the health of consumers, as well.

Smuggling is the widely held analysis of the market situation among stakeholders in Benguet, particularly the traders and farmers. As a result, the different line agencies directly involved in importation procedures were the identified venue of engagement—the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI), mandated to enforce the Plant Quarantine Law through the issuance of import permits on plants and small animals likely to become pests and inspection and treatment of imported agricultural commodities among others; and the Bureau of Customs, the principal institution tasked to enforce tariff and customs laws.

To some groups, however, smuggling is a flawed analysis, thereby targeting the wrong agencies. The *Alyansa Dagiti Pesante iti Taeng Kordilyera* (Alliance of Peasants in the Cordillera Homeland [APIT-TAKO]), a sectoral organization of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), has referred to smuggling as a smoke screen of a much larger issue which the government does not intend to confront head-on (Bagyan and Gimenez 2004). By shifting the blame to smuggling instead of legal importation, the problem is relegated to the level of

20 Smuggling violates Presidential Decree 1433 or the Plant Quarantine Law due to the absence of required permit to import (PTI) and phytosanitary certificates, and Section 2503 and 2530 of the Tariffs and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), for misdeclaration.

21 For example, Chinese carrots rejected by Japan that were illegally brought into the country contain pesticide residues that are up to four times higher than the maximum residue limit (Dumlao 2002, Baguio Midland Courier 2003).
policy implementation rather than policymaking. This becomes problematic because the tragedy experienced by the Benguet vegetable industry now becomes a symptom of Philippines’ perpetual development problem, graft and corruption, instead of its economic ideology, neoliberalism.

**Tariff reduction: diktat of the WTO**

In line with market access commitments under the AoA of the GATT, the Philippines has agreed to remove import quotas and other quantitative restrictions (QRs) and to replace these with corresponding tariff rates, which will be reduced at a predetermined schedule.22 This is codified in RA 8178 or the Agricultural Tarrification Act of 1995.23 The initial bound tariffs for most of sensitive agricultural products fall within fifty percent to one hundred percent in 1995 and 1996. These rates are then reduced to 10 to 50 percent by 2003 and 2004. For vegetables, the Philippines offered to bind tariffs at 40 percent.

Hence, the influx of imported vegetables was just the most recent repercussion of unbridled trade liberalization, under the directive of the WTO to scale down tariffs of various agricultural commodities through modification of the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN)24 tariff rates. Expedients in the form of safety nets and executive orders that temporarily increase tariffs are futile. Because of government’s accession to a rules-based trading organization, tariffs will eventually be scaled down no matter what (Bagyan and Gimenez 2004, Gobrin 2004). Since vegetable importation is a direct outcome of policy, then the most fitting and constructive tactic is to petition for the restoration of quantitative restrictions through legislation. The legislative branch, therefore, not the executive is the venue for engagement, for the reason that the Congress has the exclusive rights on tax-related matters, as stipulated in the Philippine Constitution. But a comprehensive reinstatement of quantitative import restrictions would be impossible without a repeal of RA 8178, which in effect means withdrawal of membership from the WTO.

22 Aside from the country’s WTO commitments, two other important trade blocs also affect the vegetable industry: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme under the AFTA requires member-countries to reduce tariffs on goods produced and traded within the ASEAN region to a range of zero to five percent by the year 2003. The agreement allows tariff concessions to be reduced from 15 percent to five percent by the year 2003 for asparagus, potato and young corn; from 30 percent to five percent for other vegetables; and, three percent for chickpeas and beans. The rates are much lower than the WTO levels, but the lowering of tariffs under the CEPT design is an advantage to Philippine exportable products like fresh and processed vegetables (Lantican 1998). Conversely, during the Manila Summit of APEC in 1996, the Philippines promised to phase out all tariffs to a uniform rate of five percent across all products, except for sensitive agricultural products, by the year 2004, much earlier than the time span for developing country members. Nevertheless, unlike GATT and AFTA, APEC commitments are “voluntary.” A closer examination and comparison of the nature of these agreements, however, and the principles which govern these trade blocs will illustrate that it is still the GATT-WTO tariff schedules that principally hold sway over the Philippine market. It is the WTO tariffs that are most binding—with government compelled to abide under threat of WTO sanctions (Aquino 1998).

23 RA 8178 also repealed or amended various laws, deemed inconsistent with the country’s commitment to GATT-UR; the most important of which is Paragraph 10, Section 23 of the Magna Carta of Small Farmers (Republic Act 7607), restricting the importation of agricultural products already produced locally in sufficient quantities.

24 Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading partners. The Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment simply means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners.
Tariff reduction: solo act

As opposed to the analysis that the vegetable crisis was WTO’s sole responsibility, some civil society groups have continuously asserted that the Philippine government prefers to set and apply a much lower tariff rate independently (Table 2). A 40-percent tariff on vegetables does not breach commitments on tariff schedules presented to the multilateral trade body. However, the Philippines has been unilaterally reducing tariffs on agricultural products arguing that such move is only an act of compliance to the WTO. In effect, the WTO has become the government’s scapegoat for its own faults and inaction. Government’s rhetoric that it has been completely emasculated by the trade body is a myth (Villanueva 2004). What it fails to publicly disclose is the fact that the country’s economic managers promote tariff reduction, not because they abide by the rules and procedures of the WTO for threat of retribution, but because they themselves are steadfast in their belief that this will spur economic growth.

Table 2. Most Favored Nation (MFN) Tariff Rates of Selected Imported Vegetables, 1995-2003, under GATT

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<td>In-quota</td>
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<td>Out-quota</td>
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<td>Cabbage Lettuce (Head Lettuce)</td>
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<td>Carrot</td>
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<td>Cauliflower and headed broccoli</td>
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<td>Turnip</td>
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<td>Asparagus</td>
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<td>Celery</td>
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<td>Mushrooms</td>
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Notes: 1995 – commitments/bound tariffs submitted to the WTO
2003a – EO 164 (10 January 2003) of Arroyo
2003b – EO 197 (16 April 2003) of Arroyo

Sources: Tariff Commission of the Philippines

Given this analysis, the strategy is to pressure the executive to increase tariff rates as a short-term response, while maximize the potentials of Congress in advocating for policies and laws intended to protect small farmers from the onslaught of further trade liberalization, such as safety nets, coupled with a re-calibration of the tariff program for agriculture.
Safety nets: the missing link

If programs and projects to offset the adverse effects of trade liberalization were implemented in the first place, then the vegetable crisis should have been avoided. This was the sentiment of majority of civil society groups and even local officials in Benguet. Within the WTO, states-parties can institute safety nets to cushion the blow of the AoA: increase in tariffs up to the bound rates; imposition of safeguards against unfair trade, if the situation so warrants; and, delivery of competitive enhancement measures (CEMs) to make local agriculture become more efficient.

The Philippine state is replete of protective instruments against unjust foreign competition and trade practices, as three important measures were legislated, albeit at a snail’s pace: the Countervailing Act of 1999 (RA 8751), which strengthens the procedures for the enforcement of countervailing duties on imported subsidized products; the Anti-Dumping Act of 1999 (Republic Act 8752), which provides the rules for the imposition of a duty for products entering the country at an export price less than their normal value in the ordinary course of trade; and, the Safeguard Measures Act of 2000 (Republic Act 8800), wherein government can levy a higher tariff on imports of agricultural commodities once they violate a certain volume of price, protecting local farmers growing the same products.

In connection with transforming the vegetable industry in order to compete with the onslaught of imports and maintain its foothold in the domestic market, government is also obliged to provide the necessary support, such as the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (ACEF) stipulated under RA 8178—a trust out of the proceeds of the minimum access volume (MAV)\textsuperscript{25} importations intended for farmers/fishermen and agribusiness enterprises. However, although many see the ACEF as a potential solution, it is actually ridden with loopholes and bureaucratic impediments. What is paradoxical is the fact that the ACEF draws its funding from in-quota tariff revenues earned via the importation of MAVs, necessitating further importation to sustain the ACEF. In addition, to access the funds, farmers’ organization must undergo stringent requirements, contradicting ACEF’s objective of protecting vulnerable and marginalized producers (Aquino 1998). In spite of the imperfection of policies on safety nets, lobbying for the provision of such is still indispensable.

These analyses of the difficulties faced by the Benguet vegetable sector under agricultural trade liberalization have led to civil society’s three-pronged strategy in its engagement of the state: pushing for investigation of smuggling activities, with the main goal of identifying and meting out punishment to all the actors involved, especially government officials; petitioning for the increase of tariffs of vegetables up to the GATT-consistent bound rate of 40%; and, lobbying for the competitiveness enhancement of the Benguet vegetable industry, not only through easy access of the ACEF, but also through the provision of the long-overdue assistance in production, post-production and marketing aspects.

The Engagement Process

\textsuperscript{25} The MAV refers to the predetermined minimum aggregate volume (which the Philippine government committed under the GATT-UR agreement) of a specific agricultural product which importers can bring it at a preferential (i.e., lower) tariff rates. In-quota refers to importation that falls within the MAV while out-quota refers to importation in excess of the specified MAV (Aquino 1998, 23).
Maximizing the Local Gateway

With revenues coming in trickles and the La Trinidad Trading Post in a standstill, the local government realized that they could not afford to languish and wait for national government to take action. The situation prompted local officials to take action and signaled an opportunity for farmers, traders, and other civil society actors to engage the local government. Local officials are themselves farmers and traders or are engaged in agricultural production and trade within their family, kinship, network ties, and patron-client bonds; thus foreshadowing at least responsiveness of the public servants to the demands of their social relations. A partnership was immediately forged among the three stakeholders—local government, traders, and farmers—to investigate and curb the prevalence of importation in Metro Manila, and to formulate a comprehensive development blueprint for the local vegetable industry to guarantee its competitiveness in the domestic market and artificially shield it from import surges.

At the outset, since most of the information presented by media revealed dubious import permits and extremely low price of imported vegetables, smuggling was quickly identified as the cause. In July 2002, the La Trinidad Anti-Smuggling Task Force was created through an administrative order issued by the municipal government. Actions of the task force revolved around monitoring and research of smuggling activities in Metro Manila and policy proposals, with the endorsement of the local government officials, were mainly directed to the national state agencies. Since the nature of their work entails constant interaction with retailers and knowledge of the market situation, the traders, led by the Benguet Vegetables Distributors’ Cooperative, Inc. took the driver’s seat and steered the anti-smuggling drive (Fongwan 2004, Kim 2004).

However, the provincial government through the leadership of Governor Raul Molintas, a self-proclaimed anti-GATT advocate, and Board Member Johnny Uy, Chairman of the Provincial Board Committee of Agriculture recognized from the start that smuggling was just the tip of the iceberg. The Provincial Board created the Benguet Vegetable Commission in early 2003, tasked primarily to study the impact of importation and recommend remedies by which the provincial government can endorse policies and other alternative courses of action. In light of the country’s looming full implementation of the GATT by 2005, the Commission would also identify development-related projects to enhance the status of the local vegetable industry (Molintas 2004, Uy 2004, Sales 2003b). However, the Commission was an inter-agency project, with no seat allotted for NGOs. In the process, the provincial government also initiated the establishment of the Benguet Farmers’ Federation Inc. (BFFI). The BFFI, the tangible outcome of the National Vegetable Summit in 2003, was composed of 80,000 farmers from the 13 towns of Benguet (Sales 2003c). The main objective for organizing was to address problems at the production level. To collectively deal with importation was merely secondary (Andiso 2004). Since its formation, the federation has been working closely with the provincial government, earning representation in the Benguet Vegetable Council, which replaced the old Benguet Vegetable Commission following its expiration at the end of 2003. Through the Council, the BFFI became party to a development plan of the vegetable industry in Benguet, and strengthened its partnership with the Department of Agriculture-Regional Field Unit-Cordillera Administrative Region (DA-RFU-CAR) in crop programming and with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Baguio-Benguet in its market-matching projects (Usman 2004, Santiago 2004).
The debilitating impact of vegetable imports in Benguet has likewise prompted other civil society groups in the area to strategize. For their part, they were also caught up with the vegetable crisis primarily because the industry is part of their larger campaign against agricultural trade liberalization. A federation of peasant political organizations originally focused on defense of resources and land reform, APIT-TAKO dealt with the issue of vegetable importation in 2002, when the crisis was at its peak. The group admitted that a key constraint to its involvement in the issue was the absence of organization of its constituents—the vegetable farmers. Although organizations instrumental to the foundation of the APIT-TAKO have been organizing farmers at the barangay (local village), municipal, and provincial levels since the early eighties, most of these were not sustained. In addition, a large number of farmers’ cooperatives in Benguet, particularly in the vegetable-producing towns of Atok, Buguias and La Trinidad, were established mainly to access loans and credits (Bagyan and Gimenez 2004, Cosalan, Tobias and Yano 2004). As a result, the group undertook parallel organizing, building new peasant communities and politically re-orienting existing cooperatives.

APIT-TAKO conducted massive education campaign on the impact of trade liberalization particularly in the two most affected provinces—Benguet and Mountain Province. In May 2003, APIT-TAKO organized the Cordillera chapter of the Pambansang Ugnayan ng Mamamayan Laban sa Liberalisasyon ng Agrikultura (National Network of Citizens Against Agricultural Liberalization [PUMALAG]), and launched a petition in the Cordillera region urging Congress to rescind RA 8178. In all its actions, APIT-TAKO forged a working relationship with the local government. However, cooperation was limited to the issue of legal importation and to select officials, namely Board Member Uy, the only Benguet politician who was a founding member of PUMALAG, and La Trinidad Councilors John Kim and Wasing Sacla. The group singled out the three officials because of their unwavering stand against trade liberalization, often publicly disclosed. Although consultations were mostly initiated by APIT-TAKO, they were very productive in terms of arriving at a negotiated position. For example, on APIT-TAKO’s proposal to lobby for the repeal of RA 8178, the officials found this to some extent excessive, especially since they were still concentrating their energies on pressing the national government for safety nets. But with sustained dialogue, both parties agreed to advocate for increase in tariff rates of vegetables.

Meanwhile, guided by the theology of liberation, the Vicariate of Baguio-Benguet through the Social Action Center-Baguio/Benguet also took a proactive stance in its involvement in agricultural issues. SAC’s treatment of the vegetable crisis and globalization was within the indigenous peoples framework, arguing that Benguet farmers should not be regarded as ordinary peasants but as indigenous peoples. The issue then boils down to the question of land. Essentially, SAC is not concerned about the incursion of imported vegetables in the country. Rather, it is alarmed by the policies and programs, which the government has fashioned to mitigate its impact on and enhance the competitiveness of the industry—agricultural modernization through the AFMA. Specifically, SAC is opposed to crop programming or zoning being introduced to vegetable farmers in order sustain the supply and meet the high quality standards of the consumers, the principal deficiency being leveled against vegetable farmers.

26 On a study conducted by the Province of Benguet and the Cordillera Highland Agricultural Resources Management (CHARM) Project, majority of the 14,323 farm households surveyed are not in favor of such proposal.
Through the basic ecclesial communities (BECs), SAC also organized their own farmers’ groups; educated them on GATT, AFMA and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA); and, built their capacity to engage government at the grassroots level. After which, a farmers’ congress was held where recommendations were put forward, targeting the only branch of government where laws such as GATT can be revoked, where policies such as IPRA, albeit inadequate, can be strengthened, and where new legislative measures can be introduced to protect farmers as indigenous peoples—the Philippine Congress. On the other hand, SAC and the farmers’ groups realize that the local officials, through the Provincial Board, can also enact policies for the benefit of the farmers. But most of their engagement with the local government and the line agencies in the province was to support and expedite the awarding of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs) and Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CALTs), in view of the DA’s move towards crop programming.

Ultimately, though, civil society understood the limited capacity of the local government to respond to the problems of the vegetable industry. Local governments are also victims of the systemic adoption of the neoliberal ideology. Their hands are also tied to the whims of the national government (Cosalan, Tobias and Yano 2004). The bottom line therefore was to elevate the issue and engagement to the national level.

**Struggling for Space at the National Level**

Realizing that technical expertise and public support, aside from political influence, were crucial to engage the national government, the local officials of Benguet and civil society elicited the assistance of the Fair Trade Alliance (FTA), through its convener, former senator Wigberto Tañada and the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines [KMP]), through its chairperson, Rafael Mariano (Molintas 2004, Uy 2004). FTA was instrumental in the preparation of position papers, particularly on the trigger price for vegetables. The alliance also facilitated its participation in consultations in various agencies and institutions. On the other hand, KMP pledged support for rallies and demonstrations. To strengthen their advocacy for the industry, the farmers and traders also undertook parallel networking, cultivated strong partnership with political blocs like Akbayan and Bayan Muna and NGOs such as PPI, and formalized membership in coalitions like the FTA and Alyansa Agrikultura (Agriculture Alliance). But in most of the engagement at the national level, it was a collaboration between the local government and the other stakeholders—traders and farmers—with national civil society playing a more supportive rather than leadership role. Engagement with different agencies was synchronized and concerted, with the end view of extracting the most response from the national government.

**Department of Agriculture**

Interaction with the Department of Agriculture (DA) was based on three lobbying points: investigation of permits to import (PTI) issued by BPI, increase in tariff rates of imported vegetables, and provision of safety nets for the industry. But the course of their engagement traversed three leaderships, each offering them different opportunities and priorities for action.

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27 FTA is a coalition of various industries, businessmen, labor unions, and NGOs working to review and reverse the country’s trade policies and commitments in order to provide better protection for local industries.
28 Trigger prices are levels that determine supply situation in the market. Once a trigger price is breached, importation is allowed (Cabreza 2002b).
In October 2002, at the height of importation, Agriculture Secretary Leonardo Montemayor ordered the immediate implementation of RA 8800, which intends to protect local agricultural products against import surges in view of the reported entry of vegetables from foreign sources, and at the same time actively support the initiatives of the local vegetable industry led by the Benguet vegetable industry stakeholders (DA 2002). Montemayor, known for his knowledge and understanding of the concerns of small farmers as former peasant representative in Congress, was immediately identified as a possible ally in the bureaucracy. However, later that year, Luis Lorenzo took over the post. The change in leadership at the height of importation dampened the spirits of civil society. The farmers had reservations in engaging an agri-business magnate. But in an attempt to appease the disgruntled, Lorenzo pledged to focus on core programs in favor of small farmers and fisherfolks. He immediately conducted consultations with vegetable farmers and officials from Benguet regarding DA’s proposal to the Tariff Commission to apply the maximum bound rates of 40 percent to vegetable imports and to include 20 vegetable products under the sensitive list of commodities (Gallardo 2002). In addition, under his administration, the DA expedited the Benguet Cold Chain Project, expected to address post-harvest losses and quality of Benguet vegetables. But in July 2004, Lorenzo resigned and was replaced by Arthur Yap, a move which anti-smuggling groups found adverse due to Yap’s suspected involvement in technical smuggling (Mendoza 2004). Yap’s reputation preceded him and this became a major deterrent for civil society’s engagement with DA.

Although civil society found Montemayor and Lorenzo sympathetic to their concerns and recommendations, they saw a staunch supporter through Undersecretary Ernesto Ordoñez due to his instantaneous response to the problem of importation (Alangdeo 2004, Kim 2004). He was active in bridging the gap between the agency and civil society. His initial approach, however, was to engage in battle through the media (Fongwan 2004). In any case, Ordoñez became their key in influencing decisions in the DA.

The BPI, in contrast, was very different. Civil society was at odds with its head, Blo Umpar Adiong, from the start. Adiong had been blamed for the unabated importation of vegetables, due to a series of defective import clearances that were unearthed by the traders. But what aggravated Adiong’s unfavorable position was his alleged defiance of the President’s oral moratorium on the issuance of import permits to save the Benguet vegetable industry (Cabreza 2003b). This, compounded with BPI’s failure to obtain the commitment of importers to support Benguet farmers, was sufficient for the stakeholders to cast doubt on the capability and sincerity of the BPI to address the problems of the industry. In light of the President’s decision to reorganize the BPI, Adiong handed in his resignation (Philippine Daily Inquirer [PDI] 2003).

Bureau of Customs

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29 Adiong facilitated a meeting between vegetable importers and stakeholders to resolve the controversy surrounding the importation of Australian produce. The Philippine government has a trade dispute with Australia regarding the latter’s refusal for Philippine fruits and vegetables to enter its market, on the grounds of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, and import licensing procedures. Although the importers drove a hard bargain especially on prices, farmers agreed to comply with the quality requirements, and the importers committed to patronize locally produced vegetables, to import only what is not available in the country. However, in 2003, commercial importers pulled out of the deal to buy vegetables from local farmers, arguing that their foreign clients are looking for their own brand of vegetables, not local products (Cabreza 2003a).
The stakeholders understood that anomalous import permits did not complete the smuggling equation. The Bureau of Customs (BoC), the agency supposed to be on top of monitoring the importation of goods among other things, was the core of much of the engagement of the traders’ groups led by the Benguet Vegetable Distributors’ Cooperative, backed by Councilor John Kim. The Bureau did not deny the incidence of smuggling, but downplayed the extent of revenue losses, which the traders found insulting to the Benguet stakeholders (Alangdeo 2004). At the start of the engagement, the BoC, where corruption is an open secret, was very hostile to civil society. But with DA Undersecretary Ordoñez endorsing their actions, the traders were able to penetrate the agency (Kim 2004, Alangdeo 2004), but were limited to the acquisition of documents in order to study the magnitude of the problem. As their engagement persisted, the traders’ participation in the anti-smuggling operations of the agency was institutionalized in 2003 through various memoranda stating that examination of refrigerated shipments of fruits and vegetables shall be conducted in the presence of a representative from the La Trinidad Trading Post Association, along with other concerned organizations. Likewise, they were witness to the condemnation of seized container vans and actual destruction of confiscated vegetables.

Of note are other parallel initiatives of the traders to control smuggling. Following the creation of an ad hoc, inter-agency body, the Task Force Blue Collar\textsuperscript{30}, to investigate and monitor points of entry of smuggled goods, the Early Bird Traders Association, La Trinidad Vegetable Trading Post Association, Bagsakan Traders Association, and La Trinidad Booth Holders Association founded the La Trinidad Vegetable Supreme Council. Instead of waiting for the government to identify the location of the smuggled goods, the traders went to Manila and identified the areas themselves. The traders personally got documents on import requirements from the DA and brought these to the BoC, thus avoiding critical delays. They also conducted anti-smuggling inspections in Metro Manila markets, warehouses, and port areas.

There was actually a superfluity of anti-smuggling projects initiated separately by government, civil society and business or founded as joint undertaking of the three sectors. As smuggling became almost ubiquitous, from vegetables to cellular phones, the President constituted the National Anti-Smuggling Task Force (NASTF), part of the three anti-smuggling agencies together with the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Anti-Smuggling (COCAS) and the Anti-Smuggling Intelligence and Investigation Center (ASIIC). The Benguet stakeholders are represented in each of these projects clearly indicating government’s openness towards civil society participation in subduing smuggling activities. But with no law enforcement power, their role was confined to monitoring and inspections.

\textit{Department of Trade and Industry}

Surprisingly, although the DTI is the chief agency in charge of international trade negotiations, the Benguet vegetable stakeholders found it secondary, if not totally unnecessary, to tap the agency for assistance. The traders and farmers had the impression that the DTI can only be utilized in the promotion of their products (Alangdeo 2004, Andiso 2004). Nevertheless, since the vegetable crisis coincided with the Fifth Ministerial

\textsuperscript{30} The Task Force Blue Collar was composed of personnel from the Presidential Security Group, BoC, Department of Justice, National Bureau of Investigation, Department of Transportation and Communications, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and headed by PSG Commander Hermogenes Esperon under the Anti-Smuggling Intelligence and Investigation Center (ASIIC) (Palangchao 2002).
Conference of the WTO, FTA and the SNR Coalition took the issue as part of their lobbying strategy in opposing further WTO- and trade-related liberalization. DTI Secretary Manuel “Mar” Roxas III, however, a supporter of consumer-oriented globalization was opposed to increase in tariff rates.

Fortunately, with the national elections fast approaching, civil society discovered the best way to engage the DTI—the Secretary’s political aspirations. Civil society, along with the local officials, tried to win over Roxas by insinuating that the support of the Cordillera voting public would be dependent on his stance on further trade liberalization in agriculture, especially vegetables. Thus in the end, he capitulated and supported the actions of civil society. However, although Roxas was seemingly receptive to the concerns of the civil society groups in the end, the DTI as an institution, which could have taken a more proactive role on trade issues, has somehow relinquished its role and has been reduced to a mere marketing arm of produce.

**Tariff Commission**

The Tariff Commission conducted two public hearings\(^31\) in view of the petition filed by DA, along with food crops manufacturers and importers—Basic Necessity, Inc. (BNI) and Vava Veggie, Inc., the local governments of Benguet and Mountain Province, and farmers led by the Bad-ayan Buguias Development Multi-purpose Cooperative (BABUDEMPCO) to increase up to the maximum bound levels the tariff rates on certain vegetables and root crops.

During the public hearings, the challengers\(^32\) fought for the existing seven percent tariff rates. Armed with statistics from various sources, one of which from BAS, the parties against to the petition argued that contrary to popular opinion, the volume of legally imported vegetables was in fact declining, which naturally made smuggling the real problem. Thus, inept customs implementation, rather than low tariffs, was the issue that must be resolved. The importers further contended that higher tariffs would only provide greater incentive to smuggle. Unable to make a precise distinction between legally imported and smuggled vegetables and demonstrate that the former was indeed the cause of the domestic vegetable industry’s bankruptcy, the DA’s argument for a tariff rate increase did not hold water. The Commission struck down the proposal and recommended to the Cabinet and the inter-agency Tariff-Related Matters (TRM) to maintain the status quo at seven percent.

**Office of the President**

Since the vegetable crisis began in late 2001, the local officials and traders in Benguet had been flooding the Office of the President with letters, petitions and resolutions, first asking the President to stop importation then eventually appealing to enhance the competitiveness of the industry. It was not until 2003 that the Office of the President through the Presidential Management Staff (PMS) initiated formal meetings with the stakeholders from the major

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\(^31\) Under Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, the Tariff Commission is mandated to hold public hearings for the purpose of modifying the rates of duty on various imported commodities. Moreover, it may hear industry group complaints and if there is a basis for complaint, recommend to higher officials the suspension and/or exclusion of the specific industry or sector from a particular tariff program. The hearings were held on 20 December 2002 and 21 January 2003.

\(^32\) Opposed to the increase of the tariff rates up to maximum bound levels for vegetables were McCormick Philippines Inc., Hotel and Restaurant Association of the Philippines, Australian Embassy, Pacific Alliance Trading Corporation, Sysu International, and Universal Robina Corporation.
vegetable-producing and -trading towns of Atok, Buguias, Kapangan, Kibungan to probe into the industry’s plight (Sales 2003a). These resulted in the drafting of various recommendations along the aspects of production, post-production, marketing and importation expected to enhance the productivity of vegetable farmers in Benguet (Sales 2003d, Molintas 2004). On the occasion of the 103rd founding anniversary of the province, the President herself visited Benguet, convened the BFFI, and pledged to stop the issuances of permits by BPI, along with a promise of an assistance package for production, post-harvest and transport facilities. These formal and informal engagements bore immediate results, as the President issued Executive Order 197 to raise tariff rates of imported vegetables from seven percent to 25 percent.

Legislature

The media hype over the Benguet vegetable industry’s imminent demise due to trade liberalization resulted in the filing of three separate resolutions in the twelfth Congress—HR 834 by Imee Marcos, HR 879 by Satur Ocampo, and HR 894 by Oscar Gozos—to conduct an inquiry into the importation and alleged smuggling of vegetables. The relentless lobbying of like-minded legislators, mainly from party-list groups such as Representatives Loretta Rosales of Akbayan and Satur Ocampo of Bayan Muna, in tandem with a privilege speech delivered by Benguet solon Samuel Dangwa underscoring the impact of vegetable importation to the livelihood of the farmers and by Rosales criticizing the secrecy of government in its WTO negotiating positions, gave the problems of the vegetable industry ample space in the legislative arena. In the Senate, as well, Senator Manuel Villar introduced two resolutions, SR 464 and SR 258, directing the appropriate Senate committees to conduct an inquiry into the influx of imported and smuggled vegetables, with the main objective of reviewing the GATT provision lifting quantitative restrictions on vegetables. A related resolution was also introduced by Senator Rodolfo Biazon to look into the impact of the implementation of the country’s commitments to the WTO under the GATT.

Congressional hearings, through the House Special Committee on Globalization and the Congressional Oversight Committee on Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization (COCAFM) were held, each attended by civil society. But like the public hearings in the Tariff Commission, the differentiation between legal and illegal and their attendant impact was once again the point of contention. If it was any consolation, though, the lack of government support in production and market intervention was highlighted in the inquiries. COCAFM, through its chair, Senator Ramon Magsaysay Jr., carried on continued dialogues and organized an actual field visit to Benguet. Though no straightforward resolution was laid out, civil society was able to obtain the assurance of the senators, through Magsaysay’s influence, regarding the farmers’ utilization of the ACEF.

In sum, civil society groups were comprehensive in their approach of engaging the state. With well-defined analysis of the problem, they were able to properly identify the government institutions where pressure should be applied, thus avoiding needless efforts and misuse of resources. In the course of the engagement, the relationship between government and civil society underwent through various arrangements—from largely collaborative at the local to critical and hostile at the national. On the whole, though, civil society was able to elicit only minimal response from government.

Analysis and Assessment
Strategies

Civil society utilized a range of tactics, which can be roughly classified according to the degree to which such approach targets the exact government institutions and individuals involved on the vegetable industry (direct and indirect) and the level to which these submit to rules and procedures of engagement established by law (formal and informal). Mainly, civil society action fall within the broad categorizations: formal and direct, informal and direct and informal and indirect.

Formal and direct engagement was employed merely to take advantage of the conventional and institutional mechanisms for direct participation and policy influence. For instance, at the local government level, this can be seen by BFFI’s membership in the Benguet Vegetable Council. By the same token, civil society groups participated in the consultations at the DA, DTI, and Office of the President; and in hearings held by Congress and the Tariff Commission. At the level of policy implementation, by virtue of administrative orders and memorandums, civil society was included in the official anti-smuggling operations of the Bureau of Customs and other ad hoc bodies. Basically, the logic was to work within the official gateways established by laws and procedures, in fulfillment of democratic goals and objectives.

However, the formal process draws attention to the vulnerability of civil society. The study has undoubtedly shown that the Achilles’ heel of civil society in the formal battleground of policy engagement comes from its inadequacy in organizational resources, mainly proper information to corroborate its positions. In policy engagement, information becomes a powerful weapon in various ways. First, only through accurate data can one formulate a clear analysis of and position on the issue. Positions without basis or evidence can likewise compromise public support. While it may seem prosaic, civil society, in some cases, has the tendency to ignore the importance of information. This obviously affects the outcome of its engagement because without information, civil society can only bank on banners and rhetoric as a strategy (Villanueva 2004). With the neoliberal ideology cemented in the bureaucracy, civil society cannot merely debate with government at the level of economic ideologies.33

Informal and direct strategies of engagement were used to access hostile institutions, through the support of influential allies. Central to this is building working relations with the head of concerned agencies through informal meetings and creating rapport with their staff. This method was profoundly used by civil society, as the formal process was, for the most part, cursory and undertaken only to comply with the statutes and to placate the demand for political participation.

A high level of expertise has been achieved by civil society in informal and indirect tactics, which revolved mostly on affecting the media agenda. With the media capitalizing on the issue, civil society too utilized this unofficial opening for policy engagement. Indeed, media advocacy became a huge component of civil society’s strategy, which consisted of

33 Ordoñez (2004), former undersecretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, and Agriculture and presently convenor of Alyansa Agrikultura, explains, “There is another venue for contesting ideologies, but in the line agencies or Congress, you have to be policy-oriented. In addition, you cannot just make claims and demands without basis. The policymakers will think you are ignorant or just causing trouble and will dismiss you outright.”

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bombarding the public with statements, consciously using sound bites (such as marijuana for vegetables) and farmers’ anecdotes to give the effects of importation a human face, and even building good relationships with the press, to get their message across and more significantly, to arouse public outrage for government’s inaction and support for civil society.\textsuperscript{34} McCarthy, Smith, and Zald (1996) further rationalize the necessity of shaping public opinion to collective action.

An essential task...is to frame social problems and injustices in a way that convinces a wide and diverse audience of the necessity for and utility of collective attempts to redress them...While movements’ ultimate targets are typically policymakers, movements must mobilize people and resources within the wider society in order to influence this authoritative elite. These third parties include both the mass public and reference elites, the people with whom the authoritative elite interacts and consults. (291).

\textbf{Outcomes}

Based on the tactical objectives laid down earlier, whether and to what extent the result of state-civil society engagement was is demonstrated by the dismissal of a public official involved in smuggling activities, increase in tariff rates from 7 to 25 percent, and provision of a competitive-enhancement package for the Benguet vegetable industry. Judging from these accomplished goals, it can be carelessly construed that the relations between state and civil society in addressing the impact of trade liberalization on the sector has been successful. However, a more circumspect analysis reveals that not all policy actions should be taken at face value.

The smuggling scourge continues, so long as corruption is systemic. Although there has been a decline in the illegal importation of vegetables since the active involvement of traders’ organizations in the monitoring of Customs procedures (Kim 2004), no official allegedly implicated in smuggling activities has been convicted.\textsuperscript{35} Despite the fact that Macapagal Arroyo took a political action on the matter by relieving Adiong of his duty, smuggling remains the convention in a bureaucracy that is accustomed to corruption, especially with loopholes in the Tariff and Customs Code and tolerance for such practices. For this reason, civil society is persevering in its lobby to expedite the passage of the Anti-Smuggling Bill, which provides for systematic solutions and stiffer penalties, both fine and imprisonment, for outright and technical smuggling, and for the creation of a special body against smuggling

\textsuperscript{34} Lipsky explains, “in order to encourage dissident mobilization, activists must heighten the urgency of a perceived problem, practicing a politics of polemic to inspire even the most mundane participation” (in Meyer 1993, 162).

\textsuperscript{35} On February 2004, the Office of Governor Raul Molintas sought the legal expertise of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), which the Governor himself is a member, in pursuing legal action relating to both legal importation and smuggling of vegetables. Based on the evidence pertaining to the oral moratorium on the issuance of import permits declared by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo before farmer-stakeholders and officials of the CAR during her visit in Baguio in December 2002, possible cases which may be filed were violations of Sections 3 (a) and (j) of Republic Act 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and of the Plant and Quarantine Law of 1978, which requires among others Plant Quarantine Officers to inspect and ascertain phytosanitary requirements of all plants, plant products and other materials capable of harboring plant pests. The FLAG however has indicated the matter to be moot and academic on both counts because of BPI Director’s Bumpar Adiong’s dismissal (Molintas 2004). Unwilling to give up on the judiciary, Benguet Board Member John Kim along with representatives of the major traders’ groups, submitted an affidavit-complaint with the same charges to the Office of the Ombudsman through new representation on August 2004.
composed of heads of relevant government enforcement agencies and private sector who will be appointed by the President.36

With regard to the tariff rates increase, although civil society emerged victorious due to an executive order (EO) issued by the President to increase the rates of duty of imported semi-temperate vegetables from 7 percent to 20-25 percent, the fact is every EO has a shelf life. In effect, this would imply the need for a new round of engagement once the order expires. From another angle, though, continuous engagement could contribute to the consolidation and sustained action of movements, which are at least unified on the issue of tariffs. But at the level of policy influence, EOs only serve as transitory measures with very short-term impact. The possibility of lengthening the period of the EO is still indeterminate, given the full implementation of GATT-UR by 2005, continued application of the AFTA-CEPT, and ongoing negotiations on bilateral trade agreements.

This scenario makes the competitive enhancement package wheedled out all the more important. The Benguet Cold Chain System project was finally installed in the first quarter of 2004.37 In addition, the government approved a P25.19 million loan from the ACEF for a project in Benguet that would modernize and ensure year-round production of cut flowers, cut-foliage and high-value vegetable products, thereby boosting chances of Cordillera-grown crops to compete with imported farm commodities.38 But while the accomplishment in this aspect is commendable, once more, these forms of government support are long overdue, such that it took a near-bankruptcy of the sector for them to be even deemed as necessary.

Cynicism on the policy ‘victories’ of the engagement is, however, balanced by encouraging results on other dimensions, which can be interpreted as both inadvertent and intentional. These spillover effects are manifest on three aspects: industry, civil society, and political opportunity. The most evident of which is the state’s recognition of the vegetable sector as an industry. Indeed, vegetables have been historically at the periphery in terms of agricultural development, compared to other crops. At this point, there is a clear appreciation of its importance economically and politically. The players—farmers, traders, local governments, etc.—have now taken the cudgels of upholding its survival in the global market; a concrete manifestation is a national consultative summit, which started in 2003, to formulate a development blueprint for the sector. Whereas the interests of the vegetable industry were overlooked in the previous trade agreements that the Philippine government entered into, this was not the case any longer as vegetables are not included in the Early Harvest Program between Philippines and China signed in 27 April 2005, even though raw and unprocessed agricultural products are covered by the agreement (Go 2005), as a result of the political muscle flexed by industry participants. Second, civil society in the process contributed to the strengthening of the grassroots through political organizing and raising social awareness, in order to hold government accountable and responsive to community needs. It consolidated

36 At the time of writing, the Anti-Smuggling Act of 2005, with Representatives Jesli Lapus, Eric Singson, Juan Edgardo Angara, Danton Bueser, Gerardo Espina Jr., Monico Puentevella, and Lorenzo Tañada III, has been passed. (BusinessWorld, 9 June 2005, S1/3).
37 The project consisted of: one unit of 20-footer refrigerated truck, two units of 16-footer reefer trucks (one unit was assigned to Benguet Vegetable Entrepreneurs Multipurpose Cooperative and CAR Agribusiness Development Center; users for the remaining one unit is still being identified), one unit 10-footer truck for trial operations by vegetable farmers cooperative in La Trinidad, Benguet, a cold storage building completed last February 2004, and a modular cold room (2 units, 5 ton capacity each) finished last March 2004 (Digal and Concepcion 2004).
38 The assistance, which was extended to Brookspoint Multi-Purpose Cooperative, is the first ACEF loan given to Cordillera since the credit facility was activated in 1999 (DA 2004).
and expanded its base, thereby ensuring power in both numbers and political influence. Moreover, despite differences in interests and tactics, the relationship among the civil society actors was collaborative, based on mutual needs and common goals, and their actions were complementary and in most of cases, dependent of each other. Finally, civil society in this study has also created or expanded opportunities for others.\footnote{As Tarrow (1996, 59) posits, “Protesting groups put issues on the agenda with which others copy or identify, and demonstrate the utility of collective action that actors copy or innovate upon.”} Having benefited immensely from the opportunities produced by the burgeoning movement against aggressive liberalization, the Benguet stakeholders and other civil society organizations have also exposed and gauged the points of weaknesses within the political system that can be arrested by groups of similar interests and objectives, or by their challengers.

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Strengthening Local Capacity in Responding to the Challenges of Globalization: Training on *Globalization and Democratic Governance* for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and Academic Institutions at the Local Level

**TENTATIVE COURSE DESIGN**
Josephine C. Dionisio

**Description**

This five-day training-workshop aims to contribute to the enhancement of local actors’ capacity to govern within the context of an increasingly globalized environment. The course is designed to evoke critical and creative thinking from government and civil society actors at the local level by raising their consciousness and understanding of issues related to globalization and governance. It is also designed to enable participants to intervene more effectively in domestic politics and in international policymaking by honing their skills and providing them with tools for strategic local planning, policy formulation, and consensus mobilization. A combination of different teaching techniques such as lectures, plenary and small group discussions, workshops, individual reflection sessions, and experiential learning exercises are integrated into the course design to address varied learning styles.

The TWSC conducts each batch of this training program in consultation with partner institutions at the local level to ensure that the content and methodology of the training-workshop match the needs and expectations of prospective participants.

**General Objectives**

At the end of this five-day training-workshop, participants are expected to have:

1. become conscious and mindful of the different manifestations of globalization at the local level and their repercussions to the practice of governance, especially at the local level
2. identified spaces for effective collective intervention based on an analysis of opportunities and threats in their environment and of organizational capacities and vulnerabilities in their localities
3. appreciated the need to govern globalization and the value of democratic governance
4. meaningfully participated in cooperative learning exercises towards the formulation of a workable set of policy recommendations and/or project proposals

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40 Prepared by Josephine Dionisio, Project Head, Training on *Globalization and Democratic Governance* for Local Government Units, Civil Society Organizations, and Academic Institutions at the Local Level based on basic documents for the project.

41 Deputy Director, Third World Studies Center and Asst. Prof., Department of Sociology, UP Diliman.
Tentative Topic Outline and Training Schedule

Day 0 - Arrival, Registration, and Settling In

Day 1

**AM -** Plenary Session: General Orientation and Expectations Check (2 hrs.)

**PM -** Plenary Session: Lecture/Discussion: Globalization and Development (3 hrs.)

This session will discuss and contextualize the concept of development in relation to the new world order. This session will discuss contemporary processes of economic internationalization as part of a specific development philosophy. Emphasis is on how development is defined and implemented by major agencies. It will also present and analyze the development track that the Philippine state has pursued as well as the alternatives advocated by various groups.

**Group Activity 1:** Team Building Exercise: Visioning – Tableau (2 hrs.)

Evening - Welcome Dinner Presentation of Tableaus (1 hr.)

Individual Reflection - Journal Entry: My Definition of Development

Day 2

**AM -** Plenary Session: Lecture/Discussion: Globalization and Governance (1.5 hrs.)

This session will discuss various perspectives on the politics of globalization. Globalization is viewed as a political project. This primer focuses on the nation-state as unit of analysis, examining the changing relations of state and capital, the emergence of new actors and institutions, and the implications of new forms of local, national, regional and global governance.

**Plenary Session:** Lecture/Discussion: Institutions and Actors in the Governance of Globalization (1.5 hrs.)

This session will examine the interests and power of key players in global governance. (e.g. suprastate [United Nations], regional blocs [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], multilateral organizations [World Trade Organization], international financial institutions [World Bank], national and local governments, transnational corporations, civil society) Events in the contemporary global political economy will be discussed in order to have a better understanding of the dynamics of globalization.

**PM -** Plenary Session: Lecture/Discussion: Democratic Governance in the Era of Globalization (1.5 hrs.)

The concept of democratic governance will be discussed, with an emphasis on the importance of pluralism (multi-actor, and multilayered processes). Opportunities for intervention will also be shown by focusing on the policies and mechanisms that could be used in responding to the effects of globalization.

**Plenary Session:** Lecture/Discussion: Tools: Policy Analysis, Actor Analysis, Network Mapping (1.5 hrs.)
Evening - Small Group Session: Workshop/Write-shop: Workshop on Policy Analysis and Actor Analysis (2 hrs.)

Individual Reflection - Journal Entry: My Definition of Democratic Governance

Day 3

AM - Plenary Session: Lecture/Discussion: Local Case Studies: Local Impact of Globalization (3 hrs.)
Focus on Agricultural Trade Liberalization
Focus on Sustainable Development

PM - Plenary Session: Lecture/Discussion: Tools: Environmental Scanning, Problem Tree, SWOT (3 hrs.)
Making sense of state of affairs in the social, political and economic spheres entails applying various instruments to organize concepts and events into coherent analyses to enable the identification of alternatives to various real-life problems, particularly in the context of globalization. This module provides an overview of various tools of analysis, with preference for participatory approaches and instruments, to exhibit the interface between local and global contexts, as well as enable an understanding the physical, socioeconomic and institutional aspects in local governance. The module further seeks to highlight the importance of synergy of actions/interventions among various stakeholders in the local level.

Evening - Small Group Session: Workshop/Write-shop: Implications of Globalization to Local Governance (2 hrs.)
This workshop will provide an opportunity for the participants to systematize knowledge gained about the impact of globalization to local governance. The participants will identify the challenges of globalization and opportunities for intervention and resistance in their specific local context.

Individual Reflection - Journal Entry: How We Could Achieve Development and Democracy in our Locality
Day 4

AM - Plenary Session: Event Simulation and Role-Playing: Policy Dialogue (2hrs.)
                  Lecture/Discussion:
                  Consensus-Building and Conflict Management

PM - Plenary Session: Presentation of Workshop/Write-shop Results (3 hrs.)

Evening - Fellowship Dinner: Suroy-Suroy

Day 5

AM - GRADUATION and CLOSING CEREMONY

PM - Departure